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ARTICLES
STATE COURT INTERVENTION IN SCHOOL
FINANCE REFORM
ANNETTE B. JOHNSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
U NDER CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN, the United States Supreme
Court implemented a new view of judicial activism that included
undertaking social reforms traditionally considered a legislative func-
tion and which required the judicial branch to become directly involved
in the administration of reform programs. In the area of school financ-
ing, cases decided since the Warren reform movement have been incon-
sistent and dependent upon the Court's attitude toward the limits of
judicial activism.' The outcome is determined to a great degree by the
Court's balancing of its competency to decide the issues against the
probable effectiveness of its decision.
To understand the courts' interpretation of the issues involved in
school finance cases and to predict the success of a constitutional
challenge to a state statute, it is necessary to recognize the increasingly
political nature of the decisions. The legal issues in state court litigation
of school financing systems are framed in terms of the denial of equal
protection (or equal educational opportunity) and the right to education.!
An examination of recent state court decisions indicates that the
analysis is directed not at the method of distribution of state funds but
at the adequacy of the funding with the aim of compelling the state to
fund all public education at a higher level.' Therefore, what appears to
* Assistant Dean/Associate Professor of Law, University of Toledo College
of Law. B.A., Incarnate Word College; J.D., Univ. of Toledo; M.A., Ph.D., Univ. of
Massachusetts. The author would like to express her appreciation to Joseph W.
Bauer, a student at the University of Toledo College of Law, for his assistance in
the preparation of this article.
1 Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Serrano v.
Priest 1, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Robinson v. Cahill I,
62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1974).
Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
See, e.g., Danson v. Casey, 33 Pa. Commw. Ct. 614, 382 A.2d 1238 (1978)
(plaintiffs alleged no discrimination against their Philadelphia school district but
claimed that the state formula failed to provide sufficient state support to the
district); Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978)
(holding that the state financing system failed to produce enough funds to allow
the districts to carry out a basic program of education as required by the state
constitution).
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be at issue in school finance cases is not the discovery and imposition of
equalizing formulas but the determination of the scope of the area in
which complicated educational and fiscal policy issues are to be decided
and the extent to which state educational policies are subject to judicial
review.
In assessing its competency to review the constitutionality of a state
school financing system, a court must deal with the absence of objectively
discernible standards for determining the adequacy or equality of the
educational opportunities provided by the state system. Since no one
system has been proven to produce equal opportunity, a court, par-
ticularly when the litigants before it are unrepresentative of the popula-
tion to be affected by its decision,4 is virtually without guidance in
upholding or striking down a statute based on a constitutional
challenge. Of equal importance in shaping a remedy is the court's assess-
ment of its ability to take into consideration the political forces in-
terested in the outcome of school finance litigation.' For example, the
general issue of taxation and the narrower issue of whether the taxation
basis should be primarily income or property, as well as questions of
control of educational policy and funding, have been the subject of
public debate and advocacy on all sides. Conflicting proposals have come
from teachers' unions, property owners, commercial establishments and
local school boards.
The wide interest in school finance reform is attributable to the im-
pact the level of state funding has on business and industry within the
state, property values and the quality of neighborhoods, and the income
of all state residents. An additional fact to be taken into consideration is
that complicated tax statutes and formulas for funding public education
preclude informed public debate of the issues.
' The school finance reform movement appears to be an elitist rather than
fundamental movement, spearheaded by a network of education finance scholars,
lawyers, and personnel from the United States Office of Education. See Kirst,
The New Politics of State Education Finance, 60 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 417, 428
(1979). Typically, the plaintiffs in the litigation are urban school districts, usually
serving children of poor inner city residents rather than those of the middle and
upper classes whose interests are more regularly represented in state
legislatures. See, e.g., Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Ny-
quist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Board of Educ. v. Walter,
58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979). See also J. COONS, W. CLUNE, & S.
SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 5 (1970).
1 For a discussion of the competing forces joined in the school finance reform
movements, see Kirst, supra note 4. At the very least, the movements include, on
the one side, educators, scholars, and state department of education personnel
who want to reform school financing through leveling up the lowest spending
school districts, thereby spending more state money on education. On the other
side are proponents of property tax reduction, parents of children in private
schools, and persons who advocate shrinking the size of government and leveling
down expenditures for public education.
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The income climate of the state plays an important part in a school
finance decision. The initial school finance reforms occurred in the early
1970s during a period of economic growth, but decisions are currently
being made as the economy appears to be heading into a recession and
while the nation is in the midst of a movement to reduce and roll back
property taxes. Current conditions are basic to the school finance
reform issue.'
In gauging its effectiveness in the school finance reform area, a court
must be cognizant of the political, social, and economic ramifications of
its decisions as well as the constitutional limitations on its power to
fashion and enforce a remedy. In addition, any legislative opposition
must be considered before a decision is rendered. While the separation
of powers doctrine would preclude a court from appropriating additional
sums for educational purposes, a court's decision that the system must
be funded at a higher level in order to achieve adequate or equal educa-
tional opportunities would mandate an increase in taxes upon the tax-
payers of the state. If the court renders a decision in opposition to the
legislature, judicial alternatives become limited to either the continual
review of legislative enactments until they are in accord with the value
judgments of the court or an acquiescience to the legislature at some
future point in time.' Because of the high probability of an on-going con-
flict with the legislature, only the most activist courts will undertake
reform in opposition to the legislature. This article will focus on the
nature, appropriateness, and consequences of judicial activism and
judicial restraint in the school financing area.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE
The systems of financing public education currently in effect have
developed through a history of local control, past compromises, and an
incremental state assumption of funding. If a state without a previous
history of public education financing were now proposing the initiation
of a plan, it is highly unlikely that the system of dual responsibility for
school financing currently in effect in all of the states would be
' Within the year prior to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Board of
Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 308, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979), California voters
elected to reduce property taxes to a maximum of one percent of market value
and to prohibit additional taxes even if approved by the voters of the taxing
district. In 1978 an additional 12 states adopted similar funding restriction
measures. Kirst, supra note 4, at 429. For full discussions of the implications of
California's "Proposition 13" on public education in the state, see Guthrie, Pro-
position 13 and the Future of California's Schools, 60 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 12
(1978); Rader & Lang, Proposition 13 and the Poor! The New Alchemy in the
Golden State, 12 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 681 (1979).
' The experiences of one court which chose to engage in a running battle
with a state legislature are chronicled in Robinson v. Cahill I, 62 N.J. 473, 303
A.2d 273 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1974), and its progeny. See note 80 in-
fra and accompanying text.
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adopted.' A brief review of school finance reform movements, which
have consistently advocated greater assumption of control and respon-
sibility for education by the state, puts into perspective the reformist
role urged on the courts in current cases.
The earliest schools were established following the principles of
representation and resolution of governmental functions at the lowest
effective level? These schools were, therefore, supported voluntarily by
largely rural localities and governed by a locally-elected board. The first
reform movement, which culminated in the second half of the nineteenth
century, attempted to secure a state-mandated education for every child
but was not a complete success. The success of this movement was
limited to districts with the authority to organize and tax residents for
the support of schools.0 As long as the population and wealth of the
state remained relatively evenly distributed, the system of local control
and funding was effective. Several imbalances developed during the in-
dustrial revolution, however, as a result of the migrations of population
to and concentrations of wealth in large cities. As a result, small rural
districts became impoverished. Earlier in the twentieth century, states
began to contribute to the support of local schools on a large scale by
awarding to each district "flat grants" based either on a per pupil basis
or per teacher basis." The ideal supporting this system was that with a
maximum effort the school district could supplement its own resources
with the grant monies to provide a basic education. However, the fact
that grants were awarded to every district regardless of its ability to
raise the funds locally suggests that no value was placed on the equality
of the education offered throughout the state. 2
By the early 1920s, it was apparent that the flat grant system ad-
ministered without regard to the actual need and cost of providing an
education was both ineffective for small, poor districts and unnecessary
for large, wealthier ones. As a result of the pioneering work of two
school finance reformers, George J. Strayer and Robert M. Haig, a sec-
ond reform movement produced wide-spread adoption among the states
' See W. GARMS, J. GUTHRIE, & L. PIERCE, SCHOOL FINANCE: THE ECONOMICS
AND POLITICS OF PUBLIC EDUCATION (1978). In 1974-75, state governments provided
43% of total public school expenditures. Federal funds accounted for approx-
imately eight percent of total school revenues. The remainder of school revenue
is raised by local tax levies. Id at 79.
" The history of school finance reform is well documented and discussed in J.
COONS, W. CLUNE, & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 4, at 39-242.
'0 Id. at 47-48. See also Justice Powell's discussion in Rodriguez v. San An-
tonio Indep. School Dist., 411 U.S. 1, 6-10 (1973). Texas, for example, has recognized
the right to tax local property for educational purposes at least since 1883.
W. GARMS, J. GUTHRIE, & L. PIERCE, supra note 8, at 188.
12 For discussions of the equalizing or nonequalizing effects of the "flat grant"
systems, see J. COONS, W. CLUNE, & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 4, at 52-61; W.
GARMS, J. GUTHRIE & L. PIERCE, supra note 8, at 188-90.
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of the Strayer-Haig Foundation Program, a system based upon the
establishment of a minimum support level necessary to fund an educa-
tion. The Foundation Program contained a guarantee that the state
would provide funds up to the minimum support level to any district
that could not raise the minimum guaranteed amount by taxing the
property within its district at a state-specified participation rate.3
The Foundation Program, modified by the addition of special
categorical grants for special purposes such as transportation and, more
recently, education of handicapped or disadvantaged pupils,
represented the prevailing method of sharing the dual responsibility for
school financing in a majority of the states until the early 1960s." While
the Foundation Program was a vast improvement over the flat grant
system, it shared two deficiencies. First, it incorporated no incentive for
local districts to tax themselves at a rate that would produce revenue in
excess of the guaranteed foundation level. Second, it failed to compen-
sate for the fact that, depending on property wealth of the district, two
districts taxing at the same state-specified participation rate might pro-
duce greatly disparate revenues; the wealthier districts produced
revenue in excess of the foundation level and retained the funds for
local use while poorer districts whose local contribution fell short of the
foundation level were limited to the foundation guarantee. These two
deficiencies were compounded by the frequent failure of the legislators
to provide for increases in the guaranteed level in order to absorb in-
creases in the cost of education.15
Spurred by the egalitarian reform of the 1960s, the most current
school finance reform movement has effectively advocated the adoption
of "percentage equalizing" or "district power equalizing" plans.' The
" Implicitly, the state specifies a dollar amount per pupil that is necessary to
guarantee a minimally adequate education. The state computes each district's
contribution at a fixed tax rate and provides only the difference between the
amount computed and the guaranteed expenditure level. Thus, if the state
guaranteed level is $500 per pupil, and district A with assessed property valua-
tion of $10,000 per pupil levies a 20 mill or two percent tax, district A will raise
$200 at the local level and will receive $300 in state aid; district B with an assessed
valuation per pupil of $25,000, levying taxes at the same rate, would receive $700
from local sources and would receive no state aid but would have available an ad-
ditional $200 beyond the foundation level to spend on educational purposes
within its district.
For additional examples and discussions of equalizing effects of the Founda-
tion Program, see J. COONS, W. CLUNE, & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 4, at 63-95; W.
GARMS, J. GUTHRIE, & L. PIERCE, supra note 8, at 190-93.
" See J. COONS, W. CLUNE. & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 4, at 60. As of 1965,
only 11 states (Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Nebraska, New
Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Vermont) still
employed fundamentally "flat grant" programs. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. &
WELFARE, STATE PROGRAMS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL SUPPORT (1965).
"5 See W. GARMS, J. GUTHRIE, & L. PIERCE, supra note 8, at 184-85.
e Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, the originators of the district power equaliz-
ing concept, take care to distinguish it from the "percentage equalizing" formula
19791
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ideal of the two equalizing plans is to preserve local control of the
education and spending level on a "fiscally neutral" basis so that the
total amount of revenue available for education for each pupil is not
dependent on the property wealth of that district. Briefly, these
systems are designed to equalize the property wealth base upon which
the school districts raise local educational revenue through voter-
approved taxes. To do this the state computes a formula that
guarantees the same number of dollars (in state and local funds com-
bined) to all districts taxing themselves at the same tax rate regardless
of the amount actually raised by local taxation of property within the
district. Under such a system, a poorer district could theoretically have
as much total educational revenue available to it as a wealthier district
if both districts were taxing at the same rate.
Typically, however, states impose a limitation on the local tax rate to
be matched; this limitation becomes a ceiling resembling the guaranteed
foundation level and precludes equalization of district revenues beyond
the ceiling level.17 Another deficiency of the district power equalizing
plans is that the educational expenditures of the district are dependent
on tax levies voted by residents of the district; the quality of the educa-
tion available to children in each district is, therefore, dependent on the
value placed on education by the child's neighbors. The ceiling limita-
tion and voted tax rate are variables not necessarily related to the
child's need or interest in a specific level of education.
With one exception,' the school financing systems that have been
challenged within the past five years in state courts have all been either
modified foundation plans or power equalizing plans. Both types of plans
usually impose ceilings on the amount of state participation and lack
developed and popularized by Benson. C. BENSON, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC
EDUCATION (1961). See J. COONS, W. CLUNE, & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 4, at
163-97, 201-42. In philosophy, objective and outcome, however, the two systems
are similar. The reader interested in the fairly complicated mathematical for-
mulations of the percentage equalizing system is directed to W. GARMS, J.
GUTHRIE, & L. PIERCE, supra note 8, at 193-99 for a concise discussion of the dif-
ferences in the two computations.
17 The Ohio system is typical, providing as it does that every school district
taxing at the rate of 20 mills will be guaranteed $960 per pupil (ie., $48 per pupil
per mill, state and local funds combined) and that for every mill of tax effort
beyond the 20 mill minimum participation rate, up to 30 mills, the state will
guarantee an additional $42 per pupil per mill. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.022
(Page Supp. 1978). The effect of the statute is to guarantee each district taxing at
20 mills the equivalent of a $48,000 tax base per pupil and for every mill above 20
but below 30 mills, a guaranteed equivalent tax base of $42,000 per pupil. To the
extent that a district's average valuation is greater than $48,000, it would receive
no state aid but would be allowed to keep all monies generated by the local tax
rate for the district's educational expenditures.
18 Connecticut's "flat grant" system, which in 1975 awarded $235 per pupil
without regard to the ability of the district to raise funds locally, was declared
unconstitutional in Horton v. Meskill, 31 Conn. Supp. 377, 332 A.2d 113 (Super.
Ct. 1974).
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provisions for the recapture of excess revenues generated by the
wealthier districts.19 Both modified foundation plans and power equal-
izing plans have been held constitutional and unconstitutional by respec-
tive state courts.
20
III. THE IMPACT OF RODRIGUEZ ON STATE COURT LITIGATION
The five-to-four decision by the United States Supreme Court in
Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District,1 which upheld
the constitutionality of the Texas school financing system against a
fourteenth amendment equal protection challenge, was a serious and
unexpected setback to the movement for school finance reform. Prior to
Rodriguez, reformers had observed the willingness of the Warren Court
19 In its pure form, the Coons district power equalizing system calls for
districts with assessed valuations higher than the one guaranteed by the state
(ie., in Ohio valuation in excess of $48,000, see note 17 supra) to turn over to the
state revenue raised in excess of that guaranteed by the state. For example, in
Ohio districts with assessed valuations of $60,000, taxing at 20 mills would raise
$1,200. Under a pure district power equalizing system, the district would be re-
quired to turn over to the state the $280 attributable to the higher valuation,
above $48,000, of the district. In practice, only Wisconsin had incorporated this
"recapture" provision in its district power equalizing system. This provision was
successfully challenged by plaintiffs from so-called "negative aid" districts as
violative of state constitutional taxing provisions in Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d
550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976).
1 The "district power equalizing" model advocated by school finance
reformers, J. COONS, W. CLUNE, & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 4, at 200-44, and
adopted by more than eighteen states as of 1975, has been challenged in state
court litigation in Montana, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin. See State ex reL
Woodahl v. Straub, 164 Mont. 141, 520 P.2d 776, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974)
(district power equalizing scheme held constitutional); Board of Educ., Levittown
Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct.
1978) (district power equalizing system discriminates against large cities); Board
of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979) (district power
equalizing scheme with "save harmless" and "reward for effort" provisions held
constitutional); Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976) (recognized
aid provisions of district power equalizing scheme held violative of state constitu-
tional requirement of uniform taxation). Although the absence of a negative aid
or recapture provision in the Ohio statute may seem to distinguish it from
Wisconsin cases, this distinction is probably inappropriate since Ohio case law
has established precedent for the "capture" of excess revenue generated by one
district and its redistribution to a poorer district. See Miller v. Korns, 107 Ohio
St. 287, 143 N.E. 773 (1923). The several funding formulas are readily viewed as
variants of each other and, with rare exceptions, different states exhibit more
similarities than differences in funding schemes. More specifically, for cases
holding state foundation plans to be constitutionally sound, see Thompson v.
Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975); Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d
139 (1976). But see Serrano v. Priest II, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 345 (1977) (financing plan held unconstitutional); Seattle School Dist. No. 1
v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978) (financing plan held
unconstitutional).
21 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See W. GARMS, J. GUTHRIE, & L. PIERCE, supra note 8, at
184-85.
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to extend the scope of equal protection to classifications based on
wealth in prisoner rights and voting cases. There was also recognition
of constitutionally-protected fundamental rights that were not explicitly
guaranteed in the Constitution.' The nation as a whole had observed
the particular protection afforded education by the federal courts. Since
the decision of Brown v. Board of Education23 in 1954, there had been
frequent judicial intervention in local school decisions with the courts
accepting jurisdiction to administer reforms directly, ordering
redistribution of teachers as well as pupils, monitoring student-teacher
ratios with respect to race and teacher experience, and enjoining school
closings. 4 Taking their cue from the segregation decisions and the
reform mood created by these opinions, a number of state and federal
' E.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (states
may not impose payment of fee as prerequisite to right to vote in state elections);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (denial of court-appointed counsel for in-
digent defendant on direct appeal of right in criminal case violates equal protec-
tion clause of fourteenth amendment); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (state
laws requiring indigent criminal defendants to pay for transcripts of court pro-
ceedings found to constitute de facto discrimination against defendants totally
unable to pay). Not all state-imposed restrictions on the right to vote in state
elections were found by the Warren Court to violate equal protection standards,
however, even though they would seem to bear more heavily against less affluent
citizens. E.g., Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959)
(states may require passing of literacy test as precondition to right to vote in
state elections so long as test is fairly administered and not used to discriminate
against a class).
For a discussion of the legal approach suggested by these cases for the school
finance area, see J. COONS, W. CLUNE, & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 4, at 339-93.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24 See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (outlining criteria
that would facilitate a finding of de jure discrimination in northern areas without
a background of state mandated school segregation and validating court-imposed
district wide remedies based on finding of intentional discrimination in only part
of the district); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)
(courts may impose interim rezoning in school districts to correct past discrimina-
tion, with busing seen as a permissible tool available to courts in implementing
Brown principles); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) ("freedom of
choice" desegregation plans, allowing students to choose a school to attend, held
not to comply with Brown mandate; school districts have affirmative duty to
desegregate and courts will see to it that the duty is not breached). It is in-
teresting to conjecture the extent to which the decision in Rodriguez was in-
fluenced by the Court's opportunity to observe over almost 20 years the conse-
quences of its decision in Brown and the unsatisfactory attempts of the federal
courts to monitor the segregation of school systems. The majority in Rodriguez
asserted that "[n]othing this Court holds today in any way detracts from our
historic dedication to public education." 411 U.S. at 30. But it is difficult not to
agree with Justice Marshall's assessment in his dissent that "the majority's
holding can only be seen as a retreat from our historic commitment to equality of
educational opportunity .. " 411 U.S. at 71 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 28:325
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courts prior to Rodriguez had found various states' school financing
systems unconstitutional on federal equal protection grounds.25
Because of the impact of the Rodriguez decision on the state courts
deciding subsequent cases, it is important to recognize the school-
finance related issues decided in Rodriguez. The claim of the plaintiffs
was that the Texas system, in essence a typical foundation program
funded in large measure by local property tax revenue, unconstitutionally
denied children in property-poor districts equal protection under the
fourteenth amendment by failing to provide through state supplemen-
tary funds the same level of educational expenditure as was available to
children in property-wealthy districts." The numerous interwoven
issues and observations in the Court's opinion may be conveniently
grouped under three headings: 1) choice of the equal protection test to
be applied;" 2) availability and accessibility of judicially-determinable
standards for assessing equality and adequacy of education; 3) ap-
propriateness of judicial as opposed to legislative remedial action.
Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Burruss v.
Wilkerson, 301 F. Supp. 1237 (W.D. Va. 1968) (overruling motion to dismiss);
McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.D. 1968), affd sub nom. McInnis v.
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969) (per curiam). Among the notable exceptions to this
early pro-reform trend were the Westchester County, New York Supreme Court
in Spano v. Board of Educ., 68 Misc. 2d 804, 328 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1972) and
the federal district court for Maryland in Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068 (D.
Md. 1972).
" The Texas system was a modified Foundation Program that required each
district to contribute a percentage of the minimum guarantee, based on a formula
that took into account revenue-raising ability of the district. Because of
disparities in the value of district property, however, the Edgewood school
district, taxing itself at a rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed property, could raise
only $26 per pupil above its contribution to the Local Fund Assignment for total
available state and local educational expenditures of $248 per pupil. This amount
was supplemented by $108 in federal funds for a total per pupil expenditure of
$356. By contrast, the Alamo Heights district, taxing itself at the rate of $.85 per
$100 of valuation, yielded $333 per pupil over and above its contribution to the
Foundation Program, leaving it with $558 per pupil after the state support from
the Foundation Program was added. It also received $36 per pupil from federal
sources for a total expenditure of $594 per pupil.
2 The well established two-tiered equal protection test requires the court to
decide whether the challenged statute operates to the disadvantage of some
suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly pro-
tected by the Constitution, and if so, to apply strict judicial scrutiny. If no
suspect class or fundamental right is present, the court applies the rational basis
or rational relationship test, a less stringent review which is limited to an inquiry
whether the statute rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state pur-
pose; the court therefore applies a presumption of constitutionality of the statute
and holds it unconstitutional only if it invidiously discriminates against a person
or class of persons. For a very recent Supreme Court pronouncement of the equal
protection test, see Ambacn v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (a state may require
U.S. citizenship as a prerequisite for certification as public school teacher without
violating the equal protection clause).
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Writing for the Rodriguez majority, Justice Powell discussed the lack
of consensus among educators, legislators, and social scientists concern-
ing the appropriate measurements of educational quality,28 the difficulty
of predicting the effect of untested alternative financing schemes,' and
the separation of powers and federalism principles suggested by the
second and third groups of issues." The decision rested on the Court's
conclusion, after consideration of the first set of issues, that the ap-
propriate equal protection test for school finance cases was the rational
basis rather than the strict scrutiny test. In coming to this conclusion,
the majority considered and ruled out the possibility of extending strict
scrutiny constitutional protection to residents of school districts, either
as pupils or as taxpayers, on the basis of wealth discrimination. 1 Reject-
ing an argument based on the nexus of education to the intelligent exer-
cise of first amendment rights, the Court concluded that there is no
constitutionally-guaranteed right to education.2 As a consequence of
these holdings, the Court applied the rational basis test, which requires
only that the challenged statute rationally further some legitimate ar-
ticulated state purpose. The Court held that the preservation of local
control in allowing residents to decide at the district level the nature,
quality, and price of the education provided to their children and to sup-
plement the minimum funding provided by the state was a sufficiently
compelling state purpose under the rational basis test to justify the
disparities in district educational expenditures. 3
Although Rodriguez foreclosed use of the federal equal protection
provision and the federal courts for school finance litigation, the deci-
sion did not foreclose state court litigation. While the reformers' posi-
tion became more difficult because of the likelihood that state courts
would find state equal protection clauses to be coextensive with the
federal guarantee,, the Rodriguez decision left several avenues open for
411 U.S. at 43.
Id at 41.
0Id at 39, 58.
Si Id at 19-29. The court's difficulty was in finding a definitive description of
the disfavored class, since it appeared that the Texas system might be regarded
as discriminating against 1) 'poor' people whose income fall below some iden-
tifiable level of poverty, or 2) those who are relatively poorer than others, or 3)
all those who, irrespective of income, happen to reside in poorer school districts.
Only in the first instance would the court find wealth discrimination; of the social
science evidence presented to the court, the most influential was a law review ar-
ticle demonstrating that, in Connecticut at least, income-poor people did not
necessarily reside in property-poor districts. See Note, A Statistical Analysis of
the School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE
L.J. 1303 (1972), cited by Justice Powell at 411 U.S. at 23 n.53.
411 U.S. at 35.
Id. at 51-52.
See, e.g., the court's statement in Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 11, 554 P.2d 139,
142 (1976), that "the scope of the equal protection clause of the Oregon Constitu-
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state court intervention. Rodriguez suggested a broader test for the
fundamentality of an asserted right 5 and suggested that additional
evidence of actual injury and of cause and effect relationships of educa-
tional expenditures and student achievement might be persuasive under
state equal protection clause standards.36 As a policy basis, the Court
found the complexity -of the issues and the inter-involvement of state
fiscal and educational policy, as well as the current state legislative
preoccupation with the school financing area, additional considerations
for exercising restraint." The major impact of Rodriguez was to return
questions of quality, financing, and administration of public education to
the state level. The decision left to the state courts the ability to decide
whether the reform issues are within the province of the legislature or
judiciary.'
To complete the chronology of litigation since Rodriguez, it is impor-
tant to note that the immediate impact on the school finance reform
movement was negative. With one exception,39 the highest state courts
tion and the Fourteenth Amendment is the same." Accord, Milliken v. Green, 390
Mich. 389, 395, 212 N.W.2d 711, 714 (1973) (Michigan Constitution secures the
same right of equal protection as is secured by the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment).
1 The test enunciated, assessing "whether there is a right to education ex-
plicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution," 411 U.S. at 34, has not been
consistently applied by the state courts considering school finance systems after
Rodriguez. The state courts in Oregon, Idaho, and Ohio, for example, followed the
lead of the New Jersey Supreme Court in rejecting this test, which would seem
to equate mere inclusion in the state's constitution with a finding that the right
was fundamental. See Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975);
Robinson v. Cahill 1, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976
(1974); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979); Olson
v. State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976).
1 Note the Court's language in addressing the relationship between educa-
tional opportunity and the exercise of first amendment rights: "Even if it were
conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally pro-
tected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of [a first amendment] right, we
have no indication that the present levels of educational expenditures in Texas
provide an education that falls short." 411 U.S. at 36-37. Consider also the Court's
statement in a footnote to the opinion that "an educational financing system
might by hypothesized, however, in which the analogy to the wealth discrimina-
tion cases would be considerably closer." Id at 25 n.60. Apparently, such would
be the case if elementary and secondary education were made available only to
persons able to pay a state assessed tuition figure. This, of course, was not the
argument in Rodriguez.
Id at 40, 58.
Addressing as it does questions of federalism rather than the doctrine of
separation of powers which affects division of authority by coordinate branches
of government, the United States Supreme Court did not preclude review of
legislative enactments by state courts. Id. at 39, 58.
1 This series of cases is known as Robinson v. Cahill, I through VII, discussed
in notes 55-82 infra, and accompanying text.
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created a "trend" of non-intervention in school finance legislation that
lasted through 1976. In late 1973, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed
a lower state court's holding and upheld the constitutionality of the
state's financing provisions through application of the rational basis
test." Later that same year, the Michigan Supreme Court noted that an
earlier hearing in which it declared the state's school financing system
unconstitutional had been improvidently granted and vacated its former
order and opinion. 1 Within the next three years, three additional state
supreme courts, those of Washington, 2 Idaho,'" and Oregon," each
adopted a rational basis test in reviewing and finding their state plans
constitutional. With the sole exception of the New Jersey Supreme
Court,'5 which issued a reformist opinion two weeks after the Rodriguez
decision, it was not until 1977 that a few state supreme court decisions
began to suggest that reform through state court litigation was still a
possibility. Within a two-year period the highest courts in Connecticut,"6
California, 7 and Washington'8 adopted an activist position in overturn-
ing their state school financing systems. A non-interventionist Ohio
Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973).
Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972), vacated, 390 Mich.
389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973). For an insightful discussion of the sequence of events
and political involvements affecting these decisions, see Hain, Milliken v. Green,
Breaking the Legislative Deadlock, 38 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 350 (1974). The
challenged legislation was a multilevel foundation program under which different
foundation guarantees and computational tax rates applied to districts whose
assessed valuation fell into different intervals. In 1972 the program provided
guarantees that ranged from $54.13 to $10,125.00 per pupil. In 1973 the
legislature enacted a guaranteed tax base plan (essentially a district power
equalizing system) which provided each district with a fixed revenue per mill of
tax rate. In 1973 the guarantee was set at $38 per mill per pupil on the first 22
mills of operating taxes; provision was made for annually changing the amount of
guarantee and the mill levy guarantee. Districts taxing above the "equalized"
millage rate were entitled to retain the excess revenue produced by the levy. An
analysis of school districts and budgetary behavior, based on econometric models
used to estimate the effects of the pre- and post-reform financing systems on ex-
penditures per pupil, suggests that the 1973 legislation has had little effect on
the distribution of revenues among the districts; the analysis suggests that this is
so not because the plan itself is ineffective but because the school districts
response (i.e., in voting mill levies) has been conservative. See generally S. CAR-
ROLL, THE SEARCH FOR EQUITY IN SCHOOL FINANCE: MICHIGAN SCHOOL DISTRICT
RESPONSE TO A GUARANTEED TAX BASE (1979).
42 Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178
(1974).
'3 Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975).
" Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976).
,5 Robinson v. Cahill I, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
976 (1974).
" Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 592, 376 A.2d 359 (1977).
'7 Serrano v. Priest II, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1977).
,1 Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978).
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Supreme Court decision in 1979 which upheld the state financing
systems has now thrown new grist into the analysis mill.'"
To the extent that the Supreme Court's choice of the rational basis
test and its reluctance to fashion standards for measuring educational
quality expressed a value judgment that the role of the federal courts in
public education should be reduced, the effect of its decision in
Rodriguez was to shift the essential question of judicial involvement to
each of the state courts. It is not suprising, therefore, that the post-
Rodriguez decisions appear to be an unrelated series of ad hoc decisions
which reflect the bias of the state's population toward reform rather
than a uniform trend based on objective legal reasoning or criteria. In
each instance of state court litigation that followed Rodriguez the issues
were framed in similar terms: 1) whether under the state equal protec-
tion statute the state's funding formula denies equal protection and
equal benefits to the children of the state by failing to compensate for
disparities in resources available on the basis of local revenue raised,"0
and 2) whether the state's constitutional requirement to provide a
"general and uniform" or an "efficient and thorough" system of public
schools for the children of the state is fulfilled when a state fails to con-
tribute at an adequate level to provide the required level of education to
every child."
In addressing the equal protection issue, each of the state courts con-
fronted, as did the Supreme Court in Rodriguez, the choice of tests to be
applied. The state courts also dealt with the problem of measuring
equality and defining the "education" guaranteed by the state constitu-
tion as well as with the problem of resolving the appropriateness of
judicial rather than legislative determination of these standards and
definitions. While one might expect that courts inclined to a position of
judicial restraint would tend to avoid a decision by focusing on such
threshold questions as standing, absence of indispensable parties (such
as the legislature or the governor), or even the political question issue
itself, the course of the litigation did not follow this route. Regardless of
the outcome of their decisions, the state courts have been adamant in
asserting their authority to review their respective legislatures' enact-
ments in the school financing area.2 For courts inclined to a position of
judicial restraint, the reasoning and outcome of Rodriguez in the choice
"' Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979).
50 The constitutions of all but four states contain equal protection provisions.
Lindquist & Wise, Developments in Education Litigation: Equal Protection, 5
J.L. & EDUC. 1, 22-23 (1976).
51 Twenty-nine states guarantee a system of "thorough and efficient" educa-
tion in their constitutions. Id. at 23.
2 See Serrano v. Priest II, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 751, 557 P.2d 929, 942, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 345, 357 (1977); Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d
685, 530 P.2d 178 (1975).
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of the equal protection test was determinative;' for courts inclined to
judicial activism, the choice of test was summarily resolved and their
focus directed to the issues of manageable criteria for assessing educa-
tional equality and appropriateness of judicial intervention. An analysis
of the opinions and facts in "interventionist" decisions demonstrates the
approaches available to courts inclined to intervene, as well as the
climate, conditions, and consequences of intervention. In the discussion
which follows, the primary analysis will be directed to the cir-
cumstances in these states and the contributions of each in establishing
a legal basis for judicial intervention.
IV. STATE COURT INTERVENTION
A. New Jersey: Defining Education and the Limits of
Judicial Enforcement
Delivering its decision two weeks after Rodriguez v. San Antonio In-
dependent School District," the New Jersey Supreme Court in Robin-
son v. Cahill' was demonstrably conscious of the impediments to an in-
terventionist provision. Yet the court advanced the reform movement
by an active challenge to the New Jersey system of funding education.
'.' The plaintiffs, students and taxpayers had argued that the New Jersey
system of financing public schools violated federal and state constitu-
tional provisions requiring the state to provide a "thorough and effi-
cient" system of public schools.' The court conceded that the federal
equal protection claim was governed by Rodriguez but asserted that the
"question [of] whether the equal protection demand of our State Con-
stitution is offended remains for us to decide. Conceivably a State Con-
See, e.g., Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975); Board
of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979); Olsen v. State, 276
Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976).
5 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
( 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1974) (Robinson
In brief, the challenged system, which had been adopted in 1970 as the
Bateman Act, provided minimum support aid to districts ranging from $110-160
per pupil on a weighted basis which depended on the different cost of educating
pupils at different levels. In addition the system contemplated "incentive
equalization aid" to equalize district taxing power for districts with equalized
assessed property valuation amounting to less than the guaranteed valuation by
varying categories of districts, ie., $30,000 for a "basic district," not less than
$45,000 for a "comprehensive district." The system also included Minimum
Support provisions which guaranteed funds to every district without regard to
need for equalization funds and guaranteed "save harmless" funds to districts
that would not otherwise qualify for state aid under the equalization formula.
Although enacted in 1970, and intended to be phased in over a period of years,
the system had not yet been fully funded and, in fact, the legislature had failed in
the second year to appropriate enough funds to carry the system to the second
level of phase-in. Evidence at trial demonstrated disparities in per pupil revenue
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stitution could be more demanding.""7 However, even prior to the
Supreme Court's announcement in Rodriguez the New Jersey court had
determined that disparities in district expenditures for education and in
taxpayer burdens did not constitute violations of the state equal pro-
tection provisions.58 Consequently, the court followed the lead of the
United States Supreme Court in holding that "[wlealth is not at all
'suspect' as a basis for raising revenues" and that "taxes in different
taxing districts in the State need not be uniform."59 Without involving
itself in the attempt to define the class of students (property-poor or
income-poor) who might be the subjects of discrimination, the court af-
firmed the right of residents of a political subdivision "within substan-
tial limits to decide how much to raise for services which are necessary
or sufficiently desirable to justify the exertion of the taxing power."'
Distinguishing the racial discrimination at the heart of Brown v. Board
of Education,6' the court also followed Rodriguez in finding no fun-
damental right to education and in asserting that if there were such a
right "local control" might well be a compelling state interest sufficient
to justify the discrimination.2
Considering that the New Jersey state constitution specifically man-
dated the legislature to "provide for the maintenance and support of a
thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction
of all the children in this state," 3 the court might easily have found
from $700 to $1,500 per pupil, depending upon the district; and both the trial
court and the New Jersey Supreme Court accepted this as prima facie evidence
of denial of equal educational opportunity.
, 62 N.J. at 490, 303 A.2d at 282.
See id. at 492, 303 A.2d at 282-83.
1 Id at 494, 303 A.2d at 283. In a footnote in Rodriguez, the Supreme Court
pointed out that "this Court has never doubted the propriety of maintaining
political subdivisions within the states, and has never found in the Equal Protec-
tion Clause any per se rule of 'territorial uniformity."' 411 U.S. at 54 n.110.
62 N.J. at 493, 303 A.2d at 283.
61 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
62 "Inherent in the concept of local government is the belief that the public in-
terest is furthered when the residents of a locality are given some voice as to the
amount of services and expenditures therefor, provided that the cost is borne
locally to stimulate citizen concern for performance. Thus it may not be 'irra-
tional' to deal with education in those terms." 62 N.J. at 499, 303 A.2d at 286.
Compare the court's discussion of the equal protection standard to be applied in
Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466,
408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978). In that case, the court noted that the objective
of a state school financing system is that of "providing a method of remedying in-
equalities in the right to educational opportunities which would exist in the
absence of intervention by means of state aid." Id. at 526, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
The court consequently concluded that the New York state system, relying as it
did on a formula that operated as a function of local property wealth and that in-
cluded flat grants and "save harmless" provisions, failed to meet even the ra-
tional basis test. See the further discussion of this case at note 68 infra.
0 N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, para. 6. See 62 N.J. at 508, 303 A.2d at 281-88.
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justification for its position in the test for a fundamental right enun-
ciated in Rodriguez which seemed to suggest that the mere inclusion of
a right or governmental service in the Constitution would raise the
benefit to the status of a fundamental right.14 The problem with this
analysis, according to the New Jersey court, is that there are many
rights explicitly guaranteed in the Constitution, including, for example,
the right to acquire and hold property, which are not likely candidates
for the preferred strict scrutiny review. Rather than becoming caught
in the web of the fundamental or non-fundamental right distinction, the
New Jersey court avoided the equal protection claims altogether and
reached results compatible with them through its analysis of the state
education clause.65
From the beginning of school finance litigation the absence of judicially
determinable standards for measuring the efficiency, thoroughness, or
adequacy of education has proved a major obstacle to reform through
the courts."' Before proceeding to make the argument for equal or
minimum expenditures, it is necessary to establish that expenditures
are related to the quality of the education offered. While most commen-
tators agree that there is some relationship between the amount of
money expended and the quality of education in a particular school
Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 411 U.S. 1, 34 (1973).
6 The lead of the New Jersey court in rejecting the Rodriguez fundamental
right formulation was followed in Oregon, Idaho, and Ohio. In each case, the court
cited the Robinson I analysis as a basis for refusing to apply strict scrutiny,
thereby upholding on a rational basis test the constitutionality of their state's
statute. See note 35 supra.
In the early stages of school finance reform litigation, the difficulty of
assessing educational quality proved the major stumbling block. In the United
States district court's consideration of the Illinois school financing system, the
plaintiffs had attempted to persuade the court that the fourteenth amendment
required that public school expenditures be made only on the basis of pupils'
educational needs. McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Il. 1968), aff'd sub
nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969) (per curiam). While noting that educa-
tional needs presumably included the interaction of such factors as the quality of
teachers, the students' potential, prior education, environmental and parental up-
bringing, and physical plant, the court concluded that there were no discoverable
and manageable standards by which it could determine, assuming arguendo that
the Constitution required expenditures to be made on the basis of educational
need, when the Constitution was satisfied and when it was violated. The court
was unwilling to equate expenditures with quality because "[dleprived pupils
need more aid than fortunate ones. Moreover, a dollar spent in a small district
may provide less education than one used in a large district .... [C]osts vary
substantially throughout the state." 293 F. Supp. at 335-36 (footnote omitted).
Concluding that the assessment of educational need is a function belonging to the
legislature or a state board of education, the court unequivocably stated its will-
ingness to address this problem: "Even if there were some guidelines available to
the judiciary, the courts simply cannot provide the empirical research and con-
sultation necessary for intelligent educational planning." Id. at 336 (footnote
omitted).
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system, the correlation is by no means established or exact." Once the
cost-quality premise is accepted, however, there remains the problem of
determining whether per pupil expenditures should be equalized across
the state or whether the expenditures should take into account the
special needs of some students and the variations in the costs of pro-
viding teachers and materials in different parts of the state. 8
Since the New Jersey legislature and state board of education had
failed to establish minimum educational standards for the state's schools
or to define the goals and functions of public education, the Robinson I
court had no objective measure on which to rely for its assessment of
whether the constitutional mandate had been met. The court, however,
was not deterred by its inability to define the "thorough and efficient"
education with exactness. Announcing as a guideline that "the Constitu-
tion's guarantee must be understood to embrace that educational oppor-
tunity which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for
I1 For a discussion of this correlation and the problems encountered in
establishing reliable data concerning it, see McDermott & Klein, The Cost Quality
Debate in School Finance Litigation" Do Dollars Make a Difference? 38 L. & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 415 (1974).
" In Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc.
2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978), the trial court held that the New York
system of school financing violated the state constitution on two grounds: in fail-
ing to remedy the inequalities in educational resources that existed among school
districts because of reliance on local property taxation (a violation of the equal
protection provision) and, somewhat parodoxically, in failing to provide greater
than average resources to urban school districts (a violation of both the equal pro-
tection clause and of the constitutional mandate to provide a "state wide system
of free common schools in which all children may be educated"). While the
arguments with respect to inequities created by variations in district valuation
were familiar, the court's approach to the problem of "municipal overburden" and
its requirement that special weighting be given to urban school districts is uni-
que.
Based on the evidence presented by five metropolitan school districts that
had entered the suit as intervenors, the court found that "the ability of the urban
school districts to finance education within their borders is, indeed, seriously im-
paired by a cluster of demands on the urban tax dollar collectively known as a
municipal overburden.... In some districts, such as the large urban district here,
the cost of providing essential non-educational services caused a drain on local
revenue thereby reducing the amount of money available for educational pur-
poses." Id at 496, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 621. The court also noted the reduced purchas-
ing power of the urban education dollar and concluded: "The state aid statute in
failing to give effect to the inordinate education overburdens of the large city
school districts and as a result providing them less assistance operates in a
discriminatory fashion and violates [equal protection requirements]." Id at 535,
408 N.Y.S.2d at 644. Since the state financing system awarded only equal (or in
some cases, reduced) state aid to city districts, the state revenues were held to
be insufficient to provide the education guaranteed by the state constitution; the
court found that application of the state aid formula to city districts was tanta-
mount to excluding those underachieving pupils from educational programs. Id
at 534, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
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his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor market," 9 the court
concluded that some standard of quality was implied. Looking at the
proved disparities in dollar expenditure per pupil, which varied from
$700 to $1,500 per pupil depending on the district, the court reasoned
that unless one supposes the unlikely proposition that the lowest
district expenditure happens to coincide with the level of expenditure
needed to fund an education at the "thorough and efficient" level, the
constitutional mandate had not been met. 0 Absent some set of established
measurable standards, disparity in district expenditures is itself prima
facie evidence of failure to provide a thorough and efficient system.71
The New Jersey court was not exactly comfortable with this equation
of non-equal expenditures to non-compliance with the mandate to pro-
vide a thorough and efficient system. Neither was it interested,
initially," in creating a judicial definition and standards of education.
Consequently, Robinson I interpreted the constitutional provision to in-
clude the two-fold command to the legislature to define in some discern-
ible way the educational obligation imposed by the state constitution and
to compel the local school districts to raise the money necessary to pro-
vide that level of educational opportunity to the pupils residing there. If
the local districts failed in that endeavor, the implication was that the
state itself must meet its continuing obligation to provide a thorough
and efficient education.73
The New Jersey court's opinion was most immediately noteworthy
for the new approach it offered by application of the state's "thorough
and efficient" education clause rather than the equal protection clause.
The United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez had advised that "the
very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide
public school system suggests that 'there will be more than one con-
stitutionally permissible method of solving them,' and that, within the
limits of rationality, 'the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems'
should be entitled to respect."' Moreover, the Court's recognition that
the school financing challenge represented a direct attack on the man-
ner in which the state chooses to raise and disburse state and local tax
revenue" forecast the difficulty that state courts must overcome in
determining whether to intervene in school finance reform. Since state
62 N.J. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295.
70 Id
71 In later considerations of the state system, the New Jersey court seemed to
forget that the issue decided was the right to a thorough and efficient education
and interchanged this right with the right to equal educational opportunity. See
Robinson v. Cahill IV, 67 N.J. 333, 339 A.2d 193, reprinted in corrected form in 69
N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975).
See the history of this litigation, discussed in note 80 infra.
T 62 N.J. at 519, 303 A.2d 297-98.
T, 411 U.S. at 42, (citing Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1972)).
7 The Court in Rodriguez was emphatic in articulating its federalism con-
cerns. "While '[tihe maintenance of the principles of federalism is a foremost con-
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courts review state legislative enactments, the issue is not one of
federalism as it was in Rodriguez, but one of separation of powers."0
Once a state court has declared its financing provisions unconstitutional
it must decide to what extent it is appropriate to supervise the
legislature, to retain jurisdiction, and to continue reviewing statutory
enactments until they are in conformity with the court's perception of
adequacy or equality. Although the legislature is usually not named a
party defendant because of legislative immunity, it is the only party
capable of directing compliance with whatever order is issued by the
court.
The relief requested is most frequently a declaration that the state
financing system is unconstitutional and an injunction prohibiting the
distribution of funds under the existing funding formula." Typically the
courts grant the declaratory judgment, but rather than create disrup-
tion in the current or upcoming school year they postpone the effect of
the judgment until a future specified time while retaining jurisdiction to
review after the legislature has acted or has had reasonable time to
sideration in interpreting any of the pertinent constitutional provisions under
which this Court examines state action,' it would be difficult to imagine a case
having a greater potential impact on our federal system than the one now before
us in which we are urged to abrogate systems of financing public education
presently in existence in virtually every State." 411 U.S. at 44 (footnote omitted).
70 For a discussion of the separation of powers implications in school financing
litigation see Robinson v. Cahill IV, 69 N.J. 133, 174-84, 351 A.2d 713, 735-40
(1975) (Mountain, Clifford, J.J., dissenting). See also Note, Robinson v. Cahill: A
Case Study in Judicial Self-Legitimation, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 508 (1977), which
discusses the series of Robinson opinions in light of the state's political climate
and argues that, even measured against a liberal standard for judicial decision-
making, the boundaries of the judicial function in a democratic form of govern-
ment were over-stepped.
7 There is precedent in the school segregation and busing cases for such
direct intervention by the courts. Relief approved by the United States Supreme
Court in Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), included an order to
the county supervisors requiring them to levy taxes, to raise needed funds, and
to open, operate, and maintain the public schools in the county. Furthermore,
court activism in ordering school busing with its accompanying expenses and in-
creased costs for school districts is too well accepted to need documentation.
Clearly the courts enjoy broad discretion in ordering equitable remedies to pre-
vent or cure a constitutional violation. This principle is less open to question,
however, in the busing and segregation cases, decisions made by federal courts
taking measures to ensure state compliance with mandates of federal constitu-
tion. Such actions are well grounded in the doctrine of federal supremacy. The
problem is different, however, when a state court is directing such orders against
a coordinate branch of its own government. It is at this point that the political
nature of the school financing litigation comes most clearly into focus. See Lands-
man, Can Localities Lock the Doors and Throw Away the Keys? 7 J.L. & EDUC.
431 (1978), which presents the case for an equal protection challenge to the fiscally
motiyated shutdown of a public education program and suggests that the relief
granted in Griffin would be inappropriate where state constitutions and statutes
require statewide public education and where there is significant ongoing state
financial and administrative involvement in local public education.
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act."8 If the legislature produces a new funding formula, no further court
action may be necessary. If there is no appropriate action by the
legislature, the court might order injunctive relief either enjoining the
distribution of any funds for schools, and thereby effectively closing the
schools, or ordering redistribution of appropriated funds by a formula
that it deems more equalizing. As an alternative the court might order
the local school districts to submit their budgets to the state auditor for
collection of the remaining revenue required by uniformly assessing all
property in the state."9 If at some point state officers refuse to comply
with the court's orders, they presumably would be liable for contempt.
The history of Robinson litigation, I through VII,80 chronicles with
painful clarity the imbroglio that awaits a court attempting to intervene
directly in ordering school finance reform. During the course of these
cases the New Jersey court imposed a succession of remedies, attempt-
ing at each stage to force the legislature to define the constitutional
education obligation and to compel the local school districts to raise
7 See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill , 62 N.J. 473, 520, 303 A.2d 273, 298 (1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1974).
"' See the dissent of Judge Pashman, suggesting the court adopt these
broader remedies, in Robinson v. Cahill IV, 69 N.J. 133, 155-74, 351 A.2d 713,
724-35 (1975) (Pashman, J., dissenting).
I Robinson v. Cahill VII, 70 N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976); Robinson v. Cahill
VI, 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976); Robinson v. Cahill V, 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d
129 (1976); Robinson v. Cahill IV, 67 N.J. 333, 339 A.2d 193, reprinted in corrected
form in 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975); Robinson v. Cahill III, 67 N.J. 35, 335
A.2d 6 (1975); Robinson v. Cahill II, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973); Robinson v.
Cahill I, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), cerL denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1974).
Out of Robinson I came simply a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the
New Jersey system of financing its schools, acknowledging that it was the role of
the legislature to enact a new system. When, after two years, the legislature had
not yet approved an alternative system, the court, which had retained jurisdic-
tion, was confronted with the dilemma of enforcing its earlier decision. After
noting that courts customarily forego the specification of legislation, and that it
would be "premature and inappropriate for the Court at the present posture of
this complex matter to undertake, a priori, a comprehensive blue-print for
'thorough and efficient' education, and seek to impose it upon the other branches
of government," 69 N.J. at 144, 351 A.2d at 718, the court concluded nevertheless
that if it did not act, no action would be taken. In provisional remedy for the
1976-77 school year only, it ordered the redistribution of legislatively ap-
propriated funds according to a plan that moved toward greater equalization by
eliminating the minimum support provisions to districts that did not otherwise
qualify for state aid by eliminating the "save harmless" funds. Such action was
justified, the court argued, because the legislature had defaulted. The court's pro-
visional order was subject to the possiblity that the legislature might ap-
propriate legislation to be effective the 1976-77 year, in which case the court's
order would be set aside. Id. at 155, 351 A.2d at 724. Subsequently, the
legislature enacted the Public School Education Act of 1975, and upon motion
from a number of differing parties, the court took the unusual step of agreeing to
rule on the facial constitutionality of the statute even though there had been no
lower court determination of the issues and no evidentiary hearing at which a
record could be made. The new legislation defined standards for assessing the
thorough and efficient education required by the constitution, but the funding
[Vol. 28:325
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol28/iss3/4
STATE COURT INTER VENTION
necessary funds to meet this obligation. The distinction made by a ma-
jority of the court that it might order the distribution of "appropriated"
funds but would be constitutionally prohibited from ordering an actual
appropriation seemed less than compelling, and dissenters pointed out
that the appropriation of public funds as an adjunct to the taxing power
is singularly and peculiarly within the province of the legislature.8
While no court welcomes such an on-going conflict with the legislature,
it should be clear from the outset that such is the predictable extension
of the activist position.2
B. California: Defining Equal Educational Opportunity in
Terms of Fiscal Neutrality
The California school finance system was declared unconstitutional in
1971 in the decision of Serrano v. Priest L3 Two years later, in Serrano
formulas still contained the minimum support and "save harmless" provision that
the court had found objectionable; furthermore one might easily argue, as the
several dissenting justices did, that the system, while moving in the direction of
equalizing local revenues, did not advance very far toward equalization. Never-
theless, the court, probably hoping that this would be the end, gave its approval
to the legislation contingent on the legislature's appropriating funds for it. Robin-
son v. Cahill V, 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976). Several months later, when the
legislature had not provided for full funding of the Public Education Act by the
April deadline that the court had given it, a divided court issued an order enjoin-
ing the expenditure of any funds for the support of free public schools by any
state, county or municipal officer unless timely legislative action was taken pro-
viding for the funds of the act, effective July 1, 1976, for the upcoming school
year. Robinson v. Cahill VI, 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976). The litigation ended
several weeks later when the legislature passed the funding measure and the
court ordered its earlier injunction dissolved. The court was given credit for the
imposition of a state income tax by the legislature to fund the educational
system.
For an enlightening discussion of the Robinson implications, see Tractenberg,
Reforming School Finance through State Constitutions: Robinson v. Cahill
Points the Way, 27 RUTGERS L. REv. 365 (1974).
8 "We assume it would not be disputed that the power of appropriating
public funds is commonly understood to be a legislative function. If the Court
undertakes to reallocate funds the ultimate disposition of which has been fixed
by the Legislature pursuant to the exercise of its acknowledged power of ap-
propriation, how is this new-found power of the Court to be controlled? How can
it be checked? We discern no way that this can be done. The power to ap-
propriate is singularly and peculiarly the province of the Legislature." Robinson
v. Cahill IV, 69 N.J. 133, 180, 351 A.2d 713, 737-38 (1975) (Mountain, Clifford, J.J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
8 In fact, in the New Jersey litigation, which began with a unanimous court in
Robinson I, the course of the events apparently came as a surprise to some of the
justices. Examining the full history of the Robinson cases, one can see the
justices being carried to the logical conclusion of their activist position, with
several backing off as the going became rockier.
5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971) (reversing a judgment
of dismissal and remanding for trial on a holding that if such allegations were sus-
tained, the state public school financing system must be declared invalid as in
violation of state and federal equal protection guarantees).
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v. Priest 11,8" the California Supreme Court was asked to review the in-
terim legislation designed to reform the system after the first Serrano
decision. The new legislation85 eliminated some of the objectional
features, but substantial disparities in district revenues and the
mechanisms for perpetuating the disparities remained." Both the old
and reformed systems were essentially foundation programs with a
mandatory local tax rate required for participation in the program
coupled with a flat grant of $125 per pupil. The reform legislation
substantially raised the guaranteed foundation level" and eliminated a
"reward for effort" provision that had given supplemental aid to
districts willing to vote a higher tax rate than that required to take part
in the foundation program. The second major aspect of the new program
involved the creation of "revenue limits" or limitations on maximum ex-
penditures per pupil in each school district. As explained in the court's
opinion:
These provisions allowed a district without a voter override to
levy taxes at a rate no higher than would increase its expen-
ditures per pupil over 1972-73 base revenues by a permitted
yearly inflation factor. A district having a school tax rate which
produced revenues in excess of foundation levels would receive
inflation adjustments which, when added to the full inflation
allowance, did not reach the foundation level, could increase its
revenues up to 16 percent of the preceding year's revenue
limit."
The intended effect was to allow poorer districts to move with relative
rapidity toward the rising foundation levels while allowing richer
districts to increase their revenue bases at a much slower rate.
Returning to its conclusions in Serrano I, in which the holding of un-
constitutionality had been based on both the federal and the state equal
protection guarantees, the California court in Serrano H, unlike the
New Jersey court in Robinson v. Cahill,89 relied exclusively on the state
18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1977).
See 1972 Cal. Stats. ch. 1406; 1973 Cal. Stats. ch. 208.
For a full description of the pre- and post-Serrano I legislation, see Serrano
v. Priest II, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 737-44, 557 P.2d 929, 932-36, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 348-52
(1977).
87 The reform legislation raised the foundation level from $355 to $765 per
pupil in the elementary grades and from $488 to $950 per high school pupil. At
the same time it raised the "computational tax rate," ie., the hypothetical rate
each district is required to levy in order to enjoy full participation in the state aid
program, from $1.00 to $2.23 on each $100 of assessed valuation at the elemen-
tary level and from $.80 to $1.64 at the high school level. Id. at 742, 557 P.2d at
935, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
" Id at 743, 557 P.2d at 935-36, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 351-52.
'9 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1974) (Robinson
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equal protection claim in striking down the new legislation. In doing so,
the California court suggested two additional methods for circumvent-
ing the conclusion of Rodriguez; the first involving an expansive reading
of the state equal protection clause while the second created, through
the doctrine of fiscal neutrality,"0 an objective criterion for assessing
equal educational opportunity.
Suggesting that Californians might have come to expect a greater
protection of their interests than the remainder of the country, the
court asserted that while the state equal protection provisions are
"substantially the equivalent of" the fourteenth amendment guarantees,
they are nevertheless "possessed of an independent vitality which . ..
may demand an analysis different from that which would obtain if only
the federal standard were applicable .... [11n the area of fundamental
civil liberties . . [o]ur first referrent is California law and the full panoply
of rights Californians have come to expect as their due."" Under an ex-
panded concept of equal protection the court found both a suspect class
(since local wealth is the principal determinant of revenue) and a fun-
damental right to education, 2 thus finding an appropriate basis for
strict scrutiny, and moved on to address the nature of that fundamental
right.
The court exhibited no hesitation in adopting the proposition that the
quality of education correlated to, and could be measured by, expen-
ditures made for education. 3 While not requiring that the system pro-
vide an equal expenditure level per pupil in every district, the court en-
dorsed the doctrine of fiscal neutrality, adhering to the principle that
the educational resources available to a child may not be a function of
wealth of the district in which he resides. Translating this principle into
a judicial standard, the court adopted the following prescription:
"[Eiquality of educational opportunity requires that all school districts
possess an equal ability in terms of revenue to provide students with
substantially equal opportunities for learning.""' Any system which con-
' The principle "that the quality of public education may not be a function of
wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole" originated with and was
first adopted by the California Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest I, 5 Cal. 3d
584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
"' 18 Cal. 3d 728, 768, 557 P.2d 929, 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 366, (quoting in
part from People v. Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d 943, 538 P.2d 753, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297
(1975)) (footnote omitted).
18 Cal. 3d 728, 766, 557 P.2d 929, 951, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 367 (1976).
93 Defendants had argued for an "output" measure of educational quality, ie.,
an examination of the effectiveness of the education prefaced by comparing per-
formance of pupils from each district on statewide achievement tests. The court
concluded, however, that "even using pupil output as a measure of the quality of
a district's educational program, differences in dollars do produce differences in
pupil achievement." Id. at 748, 557 P.2d at 939, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
" Id at 747-48, 557 P.2d at 939, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
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ditions the full entitlement to educational benefits on wealth, thereby
classifying recipients on the basis of their collective affluence and mak-
ing the quality of the child's education depend upon the resources of his
local district, does not meet this standard. By allowing wealthier
districts a substantial advantage in obtaining higher quality staff, pro-
gram expansion and variety, beneficial student-teacher ratios, and
modern equipment and materials, the reformed California system was
ineffective. A foundation program which allows some districts to go
beyond the state minimum level through taxation of property within the
district denies equal educational opportunity to some children. Reason-
ing from this position, the court concluded that either some form of full
state funding or district power equalizing would be appropriate alter-
natives to the California foundation program."
Concededly the fiscal neutrality principle allows "leveling down" as
well as "leveling up." Unlike the New Jersey court which mandated a
higher level of educational funding and quality, the California court's
emphasis is genuinely on equality. Quoting the trial court, the supreme
court noted:
The equal protection of the laws provision of the California Con-
stitution mandates nothing less than that all such persons shall
be treated alike. If such uniformity of treatment were to result
in all children being provided a low-quality educational program,
or even a clearly inadequate educational program, the California
Constitution would be satisfied."
In taking this position, the court presumably recognizes the political im-
possibility of legislators requiring districts which pride themselves on
the quality of available education to lower their expenditures rather
than to fund other districts at the same level. In fact, the California
legislation suggests the accommodation. Under the reform plan, wealthy
districts were not "leveled down" but they were to be held at the pre-
" The full list of "workable, practical and feasible" alternative methods ar-
ticulated by the Serrano II court includes:
(1) full state funding, with the imposition of a statewide property tax; (2)
consolidation of the present 1,067 school districts into about five hun-
dred districts, with boundary realignments to equalize assessed valua-
tions of real property among all school districts; (3) retention of the pre-
sent school district boundaries but the removal of commercial and in-
dustrial property from local taxation for school purposes and taxation of
such property at the state level; (4) school district power equalizing,
which has as its essential ingredient the concept that school districts
could choose to spend at different levels but for each level of expen-
diture chosen the tax effort would be the same for each school district
choosing such level whether it be a high-wealth or a low-wealth district;
(5) vouchers; and (6) some combination of two or more of the above.
Id. at 747, 557 P.2d at 938-39, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 354-55.
Id. at 754 n.28, 557 P.2d at 943 n.28, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 359 n.28.
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sent level while the poorer districts "leveled up." The court found no
particular problem with this approach except that the period of con-
vergence, which the trial court had found could be effected in as few as
six years,97 would take up to twenty years under the formula adopted by
the legislature." To the extent that equal tax rates still produce differ-
ing expenditure levels or, in the alternative, that equal expenditure
levels can be produced by differing tax rates, the system would continue
to generate school revenue in proportion to the wealth of the individual
district." Consequently, local control would continue to be a function of
district wealth under the new law. In such a setting the revenue limits,
by taking 1972-73 as their base, perpetuate inequities from property tax
base differentials and are too slow to produce convergence, particularly
since the legislation allowed districts to exceed the revenue limits if a
majority of voters in the district voted an override.
Although not available at the time of the court's decision in Serrano
II, a recent National Institute of Education report verifies the conclu-
sion that the California reform legislation has improved wealth neutrality
but that revenues remain highly dependent on property tax bases."0
The first year of reform saw a dramatic increase in state aid channeled
to lower-spending districts through a higher level foundation plan, and
distribution of revenues became more equal. But the revenue limits
which had been designed to hold down revenue growth in high-spending
districts so that low-spending districts could catch up also limited the
rate at which the latter could increase their revenues. Increases in state
aid, therefore, had to be translated at least partially into tax relief. The
major effect of California's reform legislation was to create taxpayer
equity. Before reform, low property value districts levied substantially
greater tax rates than high-spending districts. The combination of in-
creased state aid and revenue limits led to substantial reduction in the
low-spending districts' tax rates.' °1
The passage of Proposition 13 in California suggests one of the ways
in which the populace can counteract the effects of Serrano H. ' By
Id at 749 n.22, 557 P.2d at 940 n.22, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 356 n.22.
Id at 744, 557 P.2d at 937, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
Id at 745, 557 P.2d at 937, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
100 S. CARROLL, THE SEARCH FOR EQUITY IN SCHOOL FINANCE: RESULTS FROM
FIVE STATES 72 (1979).
... Id. at 73-74.
10 Proposition 13 was passed by California voters in June, 1978. CAL. CONST.
art. XIIIA. In brief, Proposition 13 returned most real property to its 1975-76
assessed valuation and limited property tax to one percent of full cash value. It
also prohibited the enactment of any new taxes except upon a two-thirds vote of
the California legislature for any new state tax measure and two-thirds vote of
the electorate for any new local tax measure. For discussion of the effects of Pro-
position 13 in general and on public education in particular, see Guthrie, Proposi-
tion 13 and the Future of California's Schools, 60 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 12 (1978);
Rader & Lang, supra note 6.
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enacting through initiative petition a property tax limitation of one per-
cent, California voters have in effect enacted a uniform state-wide tax
rate and prepared the way for equalization. Even in districts with the
highest amounts of property wealth per pupil, property tax revenues
will not likely constitute the state-mandated minimum per pupil expen-
diture level, and all of California's districts will qualify for equalization
aid. In such a situation, the state cannot constitutionally sustain
substantial variations in per pupil expenditures, and within some
reasonable time all expenditure differences for which there is not a
sound educational justification will need to be eliminated. Some com-
mentators, therefore, expect expenditure parity to be achieved within
three to five years.103 Along with this, however, it is to be expected that
school districts will substantially lose control over expenditures. If the
state specifies per pupil expenditure levels and specifies within tight
boundaries the school programs for which funds must be spent, and if
local tax rate discretion has been eliminated, there is little discretion
left to the local school districts.
C. Connecticut: The Clear-Cut Case
The Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Horton v. Meskill °4 in
early 1977 was the first interventionist decision to be issued in a suit filed
after Rodriguez. Of the state funding systems, Connecticut's was cer-
tainly the one most open to challenge. This system made no attempt to
equalize expenditures among districts;..5 instead it awarded flat grants
of $215 per pupil to every school district without regard to the financial
capability of the district to raise funds for education. Local expenditures
consequently accounted for seventy percent of all school expenses,'
and disparities among district expenditures ranked Connecticut fiftieth
among the states in its efforts to distribute state aid in a way which
equalized the abilities of the districts to finance education."'
103 Guthrie, supra note 102, at 13-14.
104 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977).
105 Public schools in Connecticut are financed primarily by two means: funds
raised by the town by assessment on local property and funds distributed by the
state based on a flat grant per pupil. The flat grant for 1973-74 was $215 per
pupil; subsequently it was raised to $250 per pupil. Id at 592, 376 A.2d at 365-66.
'06 Id at 629, 376 A.2d at 366.
'07 Id at 635, 376 A.2d at 368. The U.S. Department of Health, Education and
Welfare compiles data and reports it in the form of a "disparity index," the ratio
of expenditures at the 95th percentile of students to expenditures at the fifth
percentile of students. The exclusion of the highest and lowest five percent is in-
tended to allow for circumstances that might justify some extreme unevenness in
the distribution of resources. In 1975 the disparity index for Connecticut was
2.29, i.e., districts spending at the 95th percentile spent 2.29 times the expen-
ditures per pupil as those at the fifth percentile. The 1975 index for California
was 2.02, for New Jersey 1.95, for Washington 1.83, and for Ohio 1.78. Full state
funding, as is the case in Hawaii, produces an index of 1.00. U.S. DEPT. OF
HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM IN THE SEVENTIES:
ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES (1977).
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The Connecticut court concluded that education in that state was a
fundamental right. Its decision was based on the history of public educa-
tion in Connecticut and on state constitutional language making school-
ing mandatory, ascribing to the state the duty to equalize educational
opportunities.' 8 To evaluate the equal distribution of this benefit, the
court adopted the criteria accepted by the trial court for evaluating the
"quality of education," including: size of classes; training, experience,
and background of staff members; materials, books, and supplies; school
philosophy and objectives; type of local control; test scores as measured
against ability; degree of motivation and application of the students;
and course offerings and extracurricular activities."' By adopting the
conclusion that "the optimal version of these criteria is achieved by
higher per pupil operating expenditures, and because many of the
elements of a quality education require higher per pupil operating ex-
penditures, there is a direct relationship between per pupil school ex-
penditures and the breadth and quality of educational programs, '" °0 the
court created its judicially manageable standard for review of the
system.
With respect to the problem of separation of powers, the court was in
an ideal position. The Connecticut General Assembly had established a
commission to study school finance and equal educational opportunity;
the commission had reported that the present system was "inherently
inequitable" and that "Connecticut [was] not providing equal educational
opportunity for all its children."' Consequently, the court made no at-
tempt to mandate a particular system and could graciously announce
that the choice of system was a legislative function. In holding the
system unconstitutional, the court added its support to a reform move-
ment that had already begun and provided additional justification for
legislators whose constituency might be reluctant to accept reforms
that returned to their districts less state aid than under the existing
system. It laid a foundation for a system that would recognize dif-
ferences in the abilities of districts to raise local funds as well as
recognize differences in educational costs based on relevant economic
and educational factors. The court noted encouragingly that substantial
progress toward equalization could be made by redistributing the flat
grant monies according to a different formula without the need of addi-
tional state taxes.112
D. Washington" Reversing Restraint in Front of Activism
An examination of two challenges to the Washington state school
financing system provides a clear illustration of the conflicting out-
10 172 Conn. at 644-45, 376 A.2d at 372.
"9 Id at 634, 376 A.2d at 368.
110 Id
... Id. at 592, 376 A.2d at 376.
112 Id
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comes that are to be expected depending upon whether the particular
court is inclined to practice judicial restraint or judicial activism. The
1975 decision in Northshore School District No. 417 v. Kinnear"3 is
typical of the non-interventionist decisions rendered shortly after
Rodriguez. The plaintiffs' claim that the existing system"' violated both
the state equal protection clause and the constitutional provision requir-
ing the state to make ample provision for the education of all children of
the state was based largely on documentation of the broad variations in
district valuation and the consequent disparities in per pupil expen-
ditures."' In rejecting the plaintiffs' claim, the court recorded its impa-
tience with the attempt to prove a constitutional violation by percent-
ages and statistics and devoted a large part of the opinion to citing the
testimony of experts challenging the validity of the statistics and of
their claimed correlations to educational quality. Noting that among the
many graphs, charts, bulletins, and tables produced by the plaintiffs
there was no objective proof that the state had failed to discharge its
duty to make ample provision for the education of the children of the
state, the majority opinion did suggest that proof of real injury to
students would have been more persuasive to the court."'
Under the Washington system, the state mandated, that each school
district provide an educational program complying with the state
statutes and the regulations of the State Board of Education and the
Superintendent of Public Instruction. Because the state funds were in-
adequate to fund the level of instruction required by the legislature, the
districts were authorized to seek additional funding from the district by
" 84 Wash. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1975).
The Washington system in effect at the time suit was filed was a founda-
tion program that guaranteed to each district $365 per "weighted pupil." To
determine a "weighted pupil," the state superintendent's office applied a formula
by taking the average yearly enrollment of the district, counting kindergarten
children as one half, and making increased allowance for educating different
categories of students. Among these variations were .3 to be added for each high
school student, .2 for each vocational student. Some additional weighting was
allowed to provide incentives for higher certification, training and experience in
the educational staffs. In order to participate in the program, the district was re-
quired to tax property in the district at 14 mills levied upon 25% of the fair
market value; 85% of the amount raised by the district tax ("assumed money,"
since the district was assumed to have received this amount from its regular prop-
erty tax levy regardless of whether it did in fact receive that amount) was
deducted from the $365 per pupil guarantee and the difference (if positive) paid
by the state to the district. Id. at 692-93, 530 P.2d at 183. Since the apparent 15%
bonus (or "leeway") was not equalized, it provided greater benefits to school
districts with a higher assessed valuation per student. While each district would
receive 15/0, the dollar amounts per pupil would vary with differences in assessed
valuation per pupil. Id. at 747, 530 P.2d at 212.
"1 Id at 696, 530 P.2d at 185.
"I Id. at 694, 530 P.2d at 184.
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way of special levy elections. Since the districts had no independent
power to levy property taxes, the special levies had to be approved by
the voters of the district. Such a levy could not be voted on more than
two times in any one year, and districts unsuccessful in getting a levy
approved were required to operate within the funds provided by the
state. During the 1975-76 school year, forty percent of the students in
the state were in levy-loss districts. 117 The plaintiffs had presented
evidence that in many cases the failure of a special levy had required
the districts to cut personnel, eliminate classes, and reduce the number
of educational materials and textbooks available to students. The five-
justice majority was looking for more dramatic injury which could be
causally linked to the state's funding system. The following language
suggests the type of proof the court would have found persuasive:
There was no evidence that any children had been deprived of
accreditation, promotion or admission to other schools because
his district failed to meet state standards or that any student or
parent had been forced to bring suit to compel his district to
provide classes that met state standards. Nor was it shown that
the Office of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction had
held any petitioner district to be substandard."8
In addition to its reluctance to discover actual injury to school
children as a consequence of the system's heavy reliance on local prop-
erty tax levies, the court's opinion is marked by concern for the conse-
quences of holding the system unconstitutional. Such a decision might
demand "sweeping changes in the statutory code," perhaps requiring
the court to "abolish all school districts ...abolish all special school
levies . . .establish a lowest common denominator level of educational
standards and prohibit individual districts from exceeding it by means
of local funds.""' 9 The language and tone of the majority opinion make it
clear that this court had no interest in intruding into the legislative
domain.
Three years later, in Seattle School District No. 1 v. State,"' plaintiffs
relied exclusively on the state's education clause,'2 ' which described the
'" This statistic was cited in Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d
476, 485, 585 P.2d 71, 78 (1978).
118 84 Wash. 2d at 694-95, 530 P.2d at 184.
" Id. at 713, 530 P.2d at 194.
"' 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978).
... In 1973 the legislature had eliminated from the formula both "assumed
money" and, on a phased-in basis, "leeway money." The levying authority of the
local school districts for regular property taxes was also eliminated, and regular
property tax for schools was placed at the state level with the revenue
distributed under the apportionment formula. In order to alleviate the possible
adverse impact of these changes, the legislature enacted a "grandfather clause"
guaranteeing each district no less than 95% of the average amount received per
enrolled pupil during the preceding three school years, excluding any excess
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state's duty to provide an ample education as "paramount,"' 12 and won a
declaratory judgment which explicitly stated that 1) the state's duty to
provide an ample education is mandatory on the legislature and includes
the duty to define and provide funds for a "basic education" by means of
regular and dependable tax sources; 2) special excess levies used to fund
in whole or in part the "basic education" mandated by the constitution
are unconstitutional but may be utilized to fund "enrichment programs"
that go beyond the constitutional mandate. While the majority in North-
shore had been willing to accept evidence as to what constituted a show-
ing of "ample opportunity for an education," complaining that "peti-
tioners make virtually no showing whatever as to the standards or cur-
riculum which is or ought to be necessary to meet the state's duty to
provide a common school education for all children,""12 the majority in
Seattle exhibited abundant resourcefulness, employing, in the absence
of a legislative definition of a basic education, three separate ap-
proaches to the question of basic education and finding that the state's
provision of funds to the district was inadequate." '
The court looked first at the requirements of the state established by
statutes and regulations and accepted the conclusion that even at the
minimum pupil-teacher ratio contained in the state definitions of teacher
ratios, salary expenses and teacher certifications, the cost of such a pro-
gram significantly exceeded the available state funding. Applying the
standards set by accreditating agencies, the court found the funding
equally deficient. Finally, the court used an inexact collective wisdom
approach, focusing upon the theoretical normal range ability student
and applying the state-wide aggregate average per pupil deployment of
certificated and classified staff and nonsalary related costs for the
maintenance and operation of a school program for the normal range
student. Again, the court found that the ratio established by collective
wisdom was not being funded by the state.
To look for differences in evidence or facts in the two cases is to in-
vite frustration. The key difference is in the attitude of the court
toward its responsibility or authority to confront the legislature. Justice
Stafford's minority opinion from Northshore, in which he was joined by
only two other justices, became, in only slightly revised form, the ma-
jority opinion in Seattle. In the interim four of the five justices in the
majority in Northshore had been replaced on the court;125 presumably
levies. Id at 530-31, 585 P.2d at 101. Despite the "grandfather clause," the con-
version to the state equalization formula represented a loss of approximately $2
to $4 million to the Seattle school district. Id at 532, 585 P.2d at 102.
1 See discussion at id at 497-500, 585 P.2d at 84-85.
123 84 Wash. 2d at 695, 530 P.2d at 184.
124 90 Wash. 2d at 533-35, 585 P.2d at 102-03.
12 Voting with the majority in Northshore were Justices Hale, Hunter,
Hamilton, Rosellini, Wright, and Weaver; dissenting were Justices Stafford, Ut-
ter, and Finley. In Seattle, Justices Wright, Brachtenbach, Horowitz, and
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the new judges were more disposed to the activist position because the
Seattle opinion confronts directly and at length the problem of separa-
tion of powers and judicial overreaching. The opinion takes pains to
distinguish the separation of powers argument advanced by the defen-
dants from the question of judicial discretion and judicial restraint,
asserting: "Once it is determined that judicial interpretation and con-
struction are required, there remains no separation of powers issue.
Thereafter, the matter is strictly one of judicial discretion."126
In answer to defendants' argument that the court should not act
"unless things become bad enough," the majority responded: "Clearly,
these arguments are not addressed to a 'separation of powers' question.
Rather, they are directed at judicial restraint."'2 7 In arriving at this
position, the court had to establish that the state constitution's educa-
tion clause was in need of interpretation and construction and to
counter the argument that the particular mandate of the constitution,
directed as it was to the legislature, was not enforceable by the
judiciary. The court's fairly ingenious maneuvering to find a lack of
clarity and need for interpretation of the constitutional provision sug-
gests the extent of its determination to exercise judicial discretion,
especially since what is unclear is the definition of "ample education"
and the responsibility for making that determination had been vested in
the legislature."' The court's further attempt to provide a basis for
judicial enforcement of the legislative mandate is equally dubious,
resting as it does on a distinction between "personal" and "public"
guarantees and the characterization of the ample education guarantee
as a personal guarantee similar to the right to trial by jury." In the pro-
tection of personal rights the Washington court believed that it had the
power to determine whether the legislature had fulfilled its mandate
and "to go to any length within the limits of judicial procedure, to pro-
tect such constitutional guarantees"; however, in the "large field of
governmental activity having to do with public affairs, only, there are
many things that might be done or left undone in derogation of man-
datory constitutional provisions which the courts would be powerless to
correct."'
3 0
While the court refrained from retaining jurisdiction and extended
the date for compliance with its order to July, 1981, the effect of the
Dolliver joined Justice Stafford's majority opinion; Justice Utter filed a concur-
ring opinion advocating a more limited ruling, and Justice Rosellini joined by
Justices Hicks and Hamilton, dissented, primarily on separation of powers
grounds.
Id at 504-05, 585 P.2d at 88.
Id (emphasis in original).
Id at 573, 585 P.2d at 124-25 (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
Id. at 501-02, 585 P.2d at 86.
"'0 1&
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judgment is nevertheless to order the legislature to define education
and to allocate additional revenues to public education. As Judge
Rosellini points out in his dissent, the court has made the initial deter-
mination on the method and level of state funding."' Unlike the situa-
tion in Connecticut, there is no suggestion in this case that there are
funds in the state treasury that have been wrongfully withheld or
distributed. Instead, as the dissent notes, "[t]he sum and substance of
the complaint is that the funds made available by the State are inade-
quate. . . ." " In adopting this position, the Washington court has moved
from a position of routine judicial restraint to one of complete activism.
V. THE OHIO EXPERIENCE
The most recent school financing challenge to reach a state supreme
court, Board of Education v. Walter,"' emerged as a non-interventionist
decision in a climate that presented contradictions and factors leading
toward the extremities of judicial restraint and intervention. A review
of this Ohio case defines some limitations still inherent in the school
finance reform area despite the experiences of states whose courts have
assumed an interventionist position.
In several respects the Ohio situation was ripe for court action. The
Ohio Constitution contains an equal protection clause as well as a
"thorough and efficient" education clause essentially identical to that in
New Jersey litigation,"' and the district power equalizing plan enacted
in 1975 contained "save harmless" and other provisions that had been
declared unequalizing in other courts."5 The trial court's findings
31 Id at 563, 585 P.2d at 120 (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
13Id at 576, 585 P.2d at 126 (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
" 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979).
"4 Relevant provisions include OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2, which provides that
"All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their
equal protection and benefit .. " (known as the equal protection clause); OHIO
CONST. art. VI, § 2, which provides that "The General Assembly shall make such
provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as .... will secure a thorough and efficient
system of common schools throughout the 'state .. " (known as the "thorough
and efficient" clause); OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 3, which provides that "Provision
shall be made by law for the organization, administration, and control of the
public school system of the state supported by public funds .... (known as the
educational support clause); and OHIO CONST. art. II, § 26, which provides that
"All laws, of a general nature, shall have uniform operation throughout the
state ...." (known as the uniform operation clause).
" The challenged provisions of the school financing system were codified as
follows: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.022 (Page Supp. 1978) (state "basic aid" for-
mula); id § 3317.02(E) ("save harmless" provisions); id § 3317.023(A)-(C) (staffing
cost adjustments to state basic aid); id. § 3317.53(A) repealed 1978 (additional
staffing cost adjustments). At the time Walter was being litigated in the trial
court the last provision, section 3317.53(A), was still in effect though it had been
prospectively repealed by the legislature. That repeal became effective July 1,
1978.
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established the low level of funding for Ohio schools and found the ac-
tual injury that had been persuasive to the Washington court in in-
cidents of schools forced to close or encountering difficulty in complying
with state minimum standards because of lack of funds. 8' Finally, a poor
correlation between the property tax provisions supporting public
schools and the school financing formula created a mathematical certainty
of continuing under-funding and inequities in school funding.'
On the other hand, an equal number of considerations militated for a
position of judicial restraint." This is clear from the court's assertion
early in its opinion that the enactment by the General Assembly of a
guaranteed yield formula and the establishment of the guarantee level
were a "policy decision"'39 and the court's reluctance to use the judicial
process to resolve a political controversy. In spite of the fact that this
challenge on behalf of the Cincinnati school system was not cast as a
taxpayer-equity suit, the court was aware that in effect it was being
asked to determine the appropriate level and adequacy of funding for
education and not simply the appropriate or equalizing distributional
system for funds already appropriated. Sufficiently noteworthy is the
court's conclusion that "this case is more directly concerned with the
way in which Ohio has decided to collect and spend state and local taxes
than it is a challenge to the way in which Ohio educates its children." 4 '
Approaching the case from this direction, the court does not reach the
question of the nature of the benefit or of the right of school children to
have that state benefit dispersed equally.
Because of the contradictions within the system, the Ohio court had to
balance the factors in favor of judicial intervention versus restraint to
" Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 53-71, Board of Educ. v. Walter,
No. A7602725 (Ohio C.P. Hamilton County Dec. 5, 1977).
137 E.g., id at 21-22, 33-42. The relevant property tax provisions are found at
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5705.02 (Page 1973) (ten-mill limitation); id. § 5705.07 (pro-
vision for voted levy in excess of ten-mill limitation); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5705.194 (Page Supp. 1978) (provision allowing school boards to declare need for
emergency school levy). Roll-back provisions are codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 319.301 (Page 1979).
13 Concern for the funding of education had been the subject of intensive
political debate. During the decade prior to the filing of Walter, a number of
events had transpired that had led the urban schools into a period of decline.
School levies had failed at the rate of 67%, and in 1976 seven schools closed for
lack of funds. EDUCATION REVIEW COMMITTEE REPORT, 113th Ohio Gen.
Assembly, 1st Sess. (1979). Ohio ranks 50th in percentage of personal income
spent on education. The former governor Gilligan, elected in 1972, had been
strongly supported by an educational faction which he had promised increased
state expenditures for education. A state income tax had been enacted in 1972
presumably for this purpose, but many educators felt that Gilligan had failed to
make good on his promise.
,s 58 Ohio St. 2d at 371, 390 N.E.2d at 817.
Id at 375-76, 390 N.E.2d at 819.
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render a decision. The trial court had assumed an activist position but
was reversed by a non-intervening supreme court. A review of the deci-
sion will show that the Ohio Supreme Court was not exercising a posi-
tion of judicial restraint as much as it was giving the legislature an op-
portunity to complete the implementation of their planned funding
system before a judicial decision would be rendered criticizing the
system.
A. The System
The challenged funding system had been enacted by the General
Assembly in 1975 after several years of legislative attention to the
school finance issue. As did many other state legislatures, the Ohio
General Assembly commissioned a study of the state system in light of
the first Serrano v. Priest"" decision with the first report of the
Legislative Service Commission appearing in 1972. '42 Within the
legislature itself a bipartisan, bicameral Education Review Committee
was formed to prepare recommendations for adoption by the General
Assembly."" The committee's two-fold charge was to correct unequal
distribution of resources and to insure instruction of high quality for in-
dividual needs."' For political and state budget reasons the committee
recognized that it could not propose the most ideal funding of education;
instead it set out to propose a "limited and feasible set of practical alter-
natives."1 5 Prior to 1975 Ohio had financed its schools under a
guaranteed foundation program which suffered from all the usual in-
equities associated with such programs, including the disparities in
educational expenditures based on property wealth of the school
districts, the inequities of varying millage rates, and the disincentive to
property-poor districts to assess themselves at higher than the
minimum rate required for participation in the program. More
significantly, however, the presence of "no loss" clauses in the founda-
tion plan resulted in no schools in the state receiving aid under the foun-
1 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971) (Serrano .
142 OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM'N, SERRANO V. PRIEST, EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAWS AND OHIO PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE, REP. No. 106, 109th Ohio Gen.
Assembly, 2d Sess. (1972).
143 Amended Substitute H.B. No. 86, 110th Ohio Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess.
(1973).
144 EDUCATION REVIEW COMMITTEE REPORT, 110th Ohio Gen. Assembly, 2d
Sess. (1974). In gathering information for its report the committee held public
hearings in four cities: Cincinnati, Lima, Cleveland, and Nelsonville; it heard
testimony from over 200 students, parents, teachers, school administrators,
members of school boards, community leaders, and interested citizens. Reports
available to the committee included extensive computer analyses of statistical
data prepared by the Ohio Department of Education, the Department of Taxa-
tion, the Board of Tax Appeals, and the United States Bureau of the Census. Id.
at iv, v.
145 Id. at 2.
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dation formula in 1974.'"1 By 1974 every school district had found it ad-
vantageous to compute its state aid supplement based on guarantees of
no less aid than in prior years.
The 1975 plan, described as the Guaranteed Yield Plan, was intended
to create an incentive for local districts to tax themselves at higher
rates while using "save harmless" clauses providing a minimum amount
of basic state aid to protect districts suffering declines in local property
wealth and pupil enrollments.'47 It included provisions for State Basic
Aid and Categorical Aid grants to supplement revenue raised at the
local level by school districts from property taxes. State Basic Aid was
computed on a typical district power equalizing formula"4 8 but without a
recapture provision and with a ceiling beyond which revenue raised at
the local level would not be matched or equalized by state funds. The ob-
jective of the State Basic Aid provision was stated in terms of "equal
yield" and "reward for effort." Under the "equal yield" provision the
state guaranteed that every district that levied millage of twenty mills
would receive $48 per pupil per mill levied. In order to adjust for dif-
ferent assessments in effect at the time the legislation was passed, the
statute provided for an adjustment in assessment by the percentage of
assessed value to true value, thereby arriving at a state equalized mill.
For every mill levied between twenty and thirty mills the formula pro-
vided a guarantee of $42 per pupil per mill. School districts which had
revenue from these millage rates exceeding the state guarantees (which
were based on property valuation of $48,000 for the first twenty mills
and $42,000 for the millage between twenty and thirty mills) were allowed
to keep the excess revenue."9
148 Id. at 5.
'4 Id. School enrollments in Ohio have been declining by about three percent
per year since 1971 and are projected to continue declining until the mid-1980s.
Since an incremental decline in enrollment cannot be translated immediately into
reduced expenditures or staff reductions, declining enrollments have impaired
the operation of the Guaranteed Yield formula generally. A decline in
enrollments causes property values per pupil to increase. This in turn decreases
the amount of state aid per pupil. In spite of a provision in the formula permit-
ting school districts to use the average of their three most recent years'
enrollments in calculating the State Basic Aid allocations, central city schools
which are experiencing the most rapid decline in pupil enrollments have been
particularly adversely affected. EDUCATION REVIEW COMMITTEE REPORT, 113th
Ohio Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1979). See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.02 (Page
Supp. 1979).
148 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.022 (Page Supp. 1978).
"' Because of the extreme diversity in millage rates and the large number of
no loss guarantees in the foundation formula, the Education Review Committee
proposed a four-year phase-in period for the legislation along with a two-year
guarantee to "save harmless" with respect to total aid per pupil. The state
guarantee, set at $48 per pupil per assessed (state equalized) mill for the first 20
mills levied by the local district, was intended to bring all but the very wealthiest
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Founded as it was in a theory of incentives and "reward for effort,"
the plan was not intended to provide complete pupil equity. The focus
instead was on taxpayer equity and the generation of equal revenues
from equal property taxation rates. The education review and property
tax provisions, including provisions for rolling back the millage rate
when property values increase due to inflation and provision for trien-
nial updating of assessments, produced the most severe shortcomings in
the Ohio plan.
A school district's funding under the Basic Aid program was qualified
by several other provisions, each challenged by the plaintiffs as un-
constitutional, including "save harmless" provisions which assured to
districts that would not otherwise qualify for aid under the new basic
formula at least as much state aid as under the previous formula.15 ° The
final subject of plaintiffs challenge was certain provisions penalizing,
through reduced aid, school districts that failed to maintain specified
pupil-staff ratios and rewarding with additional aid districts that hired
teachers and staff at a higher salary based on greater experience or ad-
vanced training.' The Categorial Aid grants, 5 ' which may be spent by
the district only for the purposes stated, were pegged to minimum
salaries of personnel hired to deliver categorical services. Additional
funding for transportation was calculated based on millage. In addition,
there was a provision for impacted pupil aid.
Several mechanisms for property tax relief operate contrary to the
school financing formula. These are: 1) the ten-mill limitation," 2) the
property tax roll-back,"M and 3) the provision for triennial update and
sexennial reassessment. 5 Under the ten-mill limitation school districts
are authorized to levey unvoted property taxes but are subject to the
provision that unvoted property taxes on any one piece of property can-
not exceed ten mills or one percent of assessed value. In practice, then,
if another taxing authority has already levied taxes on property, the
school district is limited to the difference between the millage for the
districts in the state within the Guaranteed Yield Plan. When fully funded, the
state basic aid plan would produce a statewide average educational expenditure
of $1,200.
"0 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.02(E) (Page Supp. 1978).
151 Id. § 3317.023(A)-(C); id. § 3317.53(A)-(B).
12 Id § 3317.024.
' The Ohio Revised Code, which incorporates OHIO CONST. art. XII, § 2, in-
cludes the following: "The aggregate amount of taxes that may be levied on any
taxable property in any.., taxing unit shall not in any one year exceed ten mills
on each dollar of tax valuation of such subdivision or other taxing unit, except for
taxes specifically authorized to be levied in excess thereof. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5705.02 (Page 1973).
15 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 319.301 (Page 1979), discussed in text accompanying
note 157 infra.
15 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5715.01 (Page Supp. 1978).
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other services and ten mills. Since participation in the state funding
system requires a local millage for school purposes of twenty mills, the
authority of a school district to levy taxes within the ten-mill limit is in-
significant."'
The effect of the property tax roll-back is more dramatic. Not only
does this provision deprive the school district of the benefits of the in-
crease in assessed value as inflation raises the value of property within
the district, but it also operates to diminish state support under the
"reward for effort" provision. Under the roll-back provision, the auditor
is directed to "determine by what percent the sums levied by the tax to
levy the same number of dollars ... as were charged against all real prop-
erty in the district by the tax in the preceding year."'57 As the amount
of personal property within the district increases, the sum to be re-
quired from real estate property taxes decreases in percentage terms
and produces what is effectively a lower millage rate, which in turn en-
titles the district to less state aid as "reward for effort.""
The final provision affecting the school financing formula is the prop-
erty tax section calling for triennial updating of assessments and sexen-
nial reassessment. Because of the roll-back provisions, which operate as
well when property is updated or reappraised, the school district may
suffer a dramatic decrease in funding every three years. This would
happen, for example, if the district had been taxing at a millage between
twenty and thirty, and, as a consequence of reassessment at the inflated
values, the millage required would effectively be at or below twenty
mills. In this case the school district would lose state funds at the same
time that it did not benefit from the increased valuation of the property
within the district."9 Passage of additional millage would remedy this
problem, but during the interim the school district's budget would be
disproportionately affected, and there would be the possibility that the
voters would not approve additional millage. For the Cincinnati school
district, which underwent a triennial updating that reduced its millage
rate and therefore entitled it to a lesser guaranteed millage during the
first year of funding under the new plan, the combined effect of the
" School districts are authorized to make tax levies in excess of the ten-mill
limitation upon vote of the people. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5705.07 (Page 1973).
".. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 319.301 (Page 1979). The roll-back operates only
against real property and does not affect revenue received as a consequence from
taxation of personal property within the district. Local school revenues are raised
from both real and personal property taxes.
15 The roll-back provision does not reduce the millage rate below 20 mills.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 319.301(A)-(B) (Page 1979).
... The effect of the reassessment and updating provisions on the school fund-
ing system is discussed in EDUCATION REVIEW COMMITTEE REPORT, 113th Ohio
Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1979), which notes that the largest decreases in State
Basic Aid occur in property-poor districts which experience significant growth in
real property values and have high proportions of real property. Id at 4.
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property-tax roll-back and reassessment produced a decrease in the
amount of money the school district received from the state. Making
several reasonable assumptions about enrollment, increases in
categorical aid, future millage increase, and tax revenue growth, the
Cincinnati school district could predict that by 1980-81 its entitlement to
Basic State Aid would be reduced to zero." Declining enrollment and a
very slight increase in property valuation over a five-year period would
put Cincinnati outside the Basic State Aid program by 1980-81 even
though average per pupil costs could be expected to increase by approx-
imately 1390/o.0'
B. The Trial Court's Findings
The plaintiffs' suit in Walter was filed in April, 1976,12 during the
first year of funding under the new plan and was based on both the
state constitution's "thorough and efficient" education clause and the
equal protection clause. 63 The plaintiffs' arguments went to the ade-
quacy and manner of funding, with the bulk of the evidence directed to
proving that some districts could not raise sufficient funds and that the
state system had consequently deteriorated in quantity and quality.
At trial' the plaintiffs concentrated on evidence describing the condi-
tions in Ohio's 617 school districts and the disparities existing in per
', Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 37, Board of Educ. v. Walter,
No. A7602725 (Ohio C.P. Hamilton County Dec. 5, 1977).
Ill Id. at 33-36.
162 Suit was filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County on April 5,
1976, as a class action seeking declaratory judgment that the Ohio system of
financing public elementary and secondary education was unconstitutional under
the Ohio Constitution. Parties plaintiff included: a) the Board of Education of the
City School District of the City of Cincinnati; b) members of that Board; c the
Superintendent of Schools for the City School District of the City of Cincinnati; d)
the Clerk-Treasurer of the City School District of the City of Cincinnati; e) the
named students who reside in the City School District of the City of Cincinnati
and who attend Cincinnati public schools; f) the named parents of children attend-
ing such schools who also are owners of real property located in the Cincinnati
School District; g) all of the above in their representative capacities and as
representative parties on behalf of all similarly situated school districts in Ohio,
the members of the boards of education for such school districts, all ad-
ministrators employed by such school districts, the students who reside therein
and attend public, elementary, and secondary schools operated by such school
districts, the parents of such students, and the owners of real property situated
in such districts.
Parties defendant were the Superintendent of Public Instruction, State of
Ohio (with whom rests the responsibility of calculating the amounts of state aid
payable to each school district under the Ohio Revised Code Chapter 3317); the
State Board of Education; the Department of Education; and the Controlling
Board (which administers the School Foundation Program).
1 See note 134 supra.
1 Trial commenced on December 6, 1976, and concluded on December 5, 1977.
The trial court heard 78 days of testimony, including that of 77 witnesses and the
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pupil expenditures among the districts. The trial court adopted in toto
the plaintiffs' proposed findings of fact, which described the resources
available to urban schools as barely adequate to maintain a minimal
education program because of escalating costs, declining revenues, and
tax failures that had resulted in reductions of staff, limited after-hours
usage of the school building, poor maintenance, higher pupil-teacher
ratios, vandalism, curtailed school days, elimination of summer school,
inadequate libraries, and few musical or cultural offerings. ' The court
found the Cincinnati school district "financially destitute, starved for
funds, lack[ing] teachers, adequate buildings and equipment and that the
children resident in that district are receiving submarginal educational
opportunities."1" Similar findings were reached with respect to other
municipal school districts. Urban districts were found to have the
highest pupil-teacher ratios and the lowest level of instructional expen-
ditures while at the same time requiring more funds than non-urban
school districts in order to deliver the same level of educational pro-
gram."6 7 By contrast, certain well-financed suburban districts were found
to have the resources to offer broad curricula, low pupil-teacher ratios,
diagnostic measures and support personnel, media centers, extracur-
ricular programs, higher paid teachers and professional personnel, and
drama, music, and language courses. 68
Apart from mere subjective conclusions concerning differences in
educational quality that existed because of the disparities in funding
available to property-poor and property-rich districts, the plaintiffs of-
fered objective evidence of injury in two respects: 1) the inability of
schools to comply with the state prescribed "minimum standards" '69 and
introduction of approximately 2,400 exhibits. The record consists of 7,530 pages
of transcript. The trial court adopted and filed 388 pages of findings of fact and 35
conclusions of law submitted by the plaintiffs.
165 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 93-94, Board of Educ. v. Walter,
No. A7602725 (Ohio C.P. Hamilton County Dec. 5, 1977).
1 Id. at 111.
167 Id. at 119-20.
1 Id at 125-40. In addition, the trial court specifically found: 1) a substantial
number of children, including all students enrolled in school districts which had
less than $1,100 in total state and local per pupil expenditures in 1975-76 (62/o of
the total student population), were receiving less than adequate educational ser-
vices and opportunities, id. at 142; 2) the disparities in expenditures for instruc-
tion were directly related to the total state and local per pupil revenue
disparities, id. at 145; 3) there is a strong negative correlation between instruc-
tional expenditures and pupil-teacher ratio, id. at 148; 4) there is a correlation be-
tween total revenue per pupil and the quantity and quality of educational ser-
vices a school district is able to provide, id. at 169; and 5) there is a relationship
between the educational services provided and the educational attainment of
students, id. at 175.
169 The Ohio Board of Education is directed by statute to prescribe and pro-
mulgate minimum standards to be applied to all schools "for the purpose of re-
quiring a general education of high quality" which each school must meet for
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2) school closings because of lack of funds. Of the 1,869 schools inspected
during the period from 1972 through 1976, ninety-seven percent were
found not to be in compliance with one or more of the standards pro-
mulgated by the Ohio Board of Education."' Of these, fifty-three percent
were deficient in curriculum and instruction, and sixty-three percent
were deficient in staff and personnel.1 Moreover, under Ohio law,
which forbids a school district from operating at a deficit,' seventeen
school districts in 1976 and fifty-one school districts in 1977 applied for
closing permits.'73 Apart from the evidence of actual injury to school
children that is inherent in the school closing, the closing itself
evidences the unwillingness of the district to assume responsibility for
school support since the closing application may be made only after two
prior unsuccessful tax levy elections in that year.7 4 Since the school is
still required to be open and provide instruction for 182 days, the effect
of closing is not limited to one academic year. By lengthening the term
chartering purposes. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3301.07 (Page Supp. 1978). Among
the areas to be covered by the standards are curriculum; certification of teachers,
administrators and other professional personnel; instructional materials and
equipment, including library facilities; organization, administration and supervi-
sion of each school; buildings, grounds, health and sanitary facilities; admission of
pupils; such requirements for promotion from grade to grade "as will assure that
they are capable and prepared for the level of study to which they are certified";
requirements for graduation; and such other factors as the board finds necessary.
Id. § 3301.07(D).
"' Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 54, Board of Educ. v. Walter,
No. A7602725 (Ohio C.P. Hamilton County Dec. 5, 1977).
171 Id. at 55.
' See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5705.412 (Page Supp. 1978), which prohibits
school districts from making any contract or order involving the expenditure of
money unless the district has been certified by the Treasurer to have sufficient
funds under existing levies to operate an adequate educational program on the
days set forth in its adopted school calendar for the current fiscal year. See also
id §§ 3313.483, 3313.437, which prescribe the procedure whereby a school district
which has insufficient funds to open on all days set forth in its school calendar
must seek authorization to close for the remainder of the fiscal year. The problem
of school closings was exacerbated in Ohio prior to 1979 because the school
districts' fiscal year did not coincide with the state's fiscal year. In addition,
Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 59 authorizes school districts unable to meet
operating expenditures for the remainder of the school year to enact voter-
approved district income tax. See id. § 3317.62. See also id. § 3317.61, which pro-
vides the mechanism for emergency school advancement loans for financially
troubled districts.
... Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 57, Board of Educ. v. Walter,
No. A7602725 (Ohio C.P. Hamilton County Dec. 5, 1977). Of the 51 school districts
which had applied for closing permits as of November 1977, 33 had been certified
by the auditor for closings ranging from 3 to 63 days, for a total of 856 school
days affecting 282,635 students. Id. at 63-69. The trial court specifically found
that children deprived of schooling as a result of school closings suffered educa-
tional losses. Id. at 70.
... Id at 55.
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in the fiscal year after closing, the school district is exhausting money
that has been budgeted for the upcoming year, and the problem con-
tinues indefinitely.'7 5
With respect to the allegations of inequities in the statutory system,
the plaintiffs presented evidence demonstrating the variations in
district property valuation, ranging from $282,897 per pupil to $4,286
per pupil in 1975-76. T" Because of this disparity, the twenty mill levy
raised $5,658 per pupil in the highest valuation district and only $86 per
pupil in the lowest valuation district 17 7 and created an inequality in
districts' per pupil expenditures for which the Basic State Aid formula
failed to compensate.'
7
The plaintiffs' contention that the "save harmless" provision and the
premium and penalties provisions are anti-equalizing was not
contested.'79 Under the "save harmless" provision $5 million in 1975-76
and $10 million in 1976-77 was awarded to school districts, including fif-
teen of the twenty wealthiest districts. No "save harmless" money was
awarded to the urban school districts or to school districts which had
applied for closing permits.185 As the funding formula approaches full
funding, the amount distributed under these provisions will increase.
Under the penalties provision a school district forfeits some of its basic
aid if it fails to maintain a specified teacher-pupil ratio and specified
educational service personnel ratio.'"' On the other hand, districts hiring
"I Id at 62, Board of Educ. v. Walter, No. A7602725 (Ohio C.P. Hamilton County
Dec. 5, 1977).
176 Id at 211.
'17 Id. at 213.
171 Id at 209. In Ohio, local tax revenues account for 62.8% of total expen-
ditures for education. Id. at 50. Consequently, 1975-76 per pupil expenditures
varies from $604 in the poorest districts to $3,537 in the wealthiest, a ratio of 6.1
to 1 for State Basic Aid and local support, or from $722 to $3,563, a ratio of 4.91
to 1 when total state support (including categorical grants) was added to local
support. Id. at 43. For that year, school districts in the 90th percentile of prop-
erty wealth averaged $1,460 in total state aid per pupil, those in the 10th percen-
tile averaged $776, but the overwhelming majority of pupils attended school in
school districts funded at less than $110 per pupil. Id. at 47. These failures of the
Basic Aid provision to compensate for disparities in expenditure are mitigated
somewhat by the fact that the statistics used are for the first year of funding,
which was phased in at the 17% level, ie., the school districts received 17% of
the difference between what they received under the former funding formula and
what they would receive under the new formula if the computation of state aid
were made at the full funding level under the statute.
'" See Robinson v. Cahill I, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 976 (1974).
" Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 297-99, Board of Educ. v.
Walter, No. A7602725 (Ohio C.P. Hamilton County Dec. 5, 1977).
"' See note 160 supra. In 1975-76, 401 districts incurred penalties related to
one or more of the mandates. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 294,
Board of Educ. v. Walter, No. A7602725 (Ohio C.P. Hamilton County Dec. 5, 1977).
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teachers with higher levels of experience are awarded premiums.'82
Since the amount of money available for instructional personnel cor-
relates statistically with total state and local support, the overall effect
of these provisions is to penalize poor districts.183
Based on these facts and the trial court's willingness to believe
testimony of expert witnesses correlating disparities in instructional ex-
penditures with quality of education and educational attainment of
pupils, the trial court ruled that the current system of school financing,
which relied to a large extent on local property wealth and voted levies,
failed to provide equal educational opportunity to the children of the
state." With respect to the claim that the system denied school children
in the state the benefits of a "thorough and efficient" system of schools,
the trial court concluded that the Ohio Constitution had created an en-
forceable constitutional right to more than a minimal education.'85 Since
the duty to provide a thorough and efficient system is a state duty, the
inability of a school district to secure sufficient revenue to finance such
a system imposes on the state the duty to provide the additional funds
necessary, and the constitutional standard is not met if any of the school
districts are starved for funds or lack teachers, buildings, or
equipment.""8
With respect to the equal protection clause, the court specifically held
that the statutory system resulted in disparate treatment of school
children and that this disparate treatment, based as it was on the prop-
erty wealth of a district, resulted in discrimination against a majority of
Ohio's school children. 1' Applying the strict scrutiny test to the
resulting discriminatory treatment, the court examined the possible
compelling state purposes which might justify the discrimination and
found them all wanting. The court found the purpose of local control not
compelling'" and was not persuaded by the defendant's claim that the
state lacked the resources to adequately fund education. 88 Specifically,
the court found unconstitutional the mandate provisions," the "save
harmless" clauses,'9' and the concept of district power equalizing,"2 with
82 See note 135 supra. In 1975-76, 230 districts received awards. Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law at 294, Board of Educ. v. Walter, No. A7602725
(Ohio C.P. Hamilton County Dec. 5, 1977).
" Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 294, Board of Educ. v. Walter,
No. A7602725 (Ohio C.P. Hamilton County Dec. 5, 1977).
Id at 376.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 376-77.
Id at 397.
88Idt
I& at 380-82.
Id- at 382-84.
192IM at 384-87.
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its attendant reward for effort, because they link the quality of educa-
tion to property wealth, income wealth (since income wealth correlates
with tax rate), and voter willingness to fund educational opportunity.
Since the trial court based its decisions on the adequacy of the educa-
tion provided and on the manner of distributing state funds for educa-
tion on the challenged system, an affirmance of either the education or
equal protection clause grounds would lead to an affirmance of the trial
court's holding of unconstitutionality. In fact, based on arguments
repeated before the Ohio Supreme Court, the court of appeals193 upheld
the trial court's ruling on the equal protection claim affirming the con-
stitutional right to education but reversed the ruling that the current
system failed to provide for a "thorough and efficient" system. The
court held that the determination of whether a system was "thorough
and efficient" had been constitutionally assigned to the legislature.
C. The Ohio Supreme Court's Decision
In Walter, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the statutory financing
scheme did not violate either the equal protection or the "thorough and
efficient" clauses of the Ohio Constitution.9 ' The court asserted that it
intended to apply the two-tiered equal protection test in determining
whether the statutory provisions violated the state equal protection
clause. Under this analysis, unequal treatment of classes of people is
valid if a state can show a rational basis for the inequality unless the
discrimination impairs the exercise of a fundamental right or
establishes a suspect classification. If the infringement of a fundamental
right is involved, the discrimination becomes the subject of strict
judicial scrutiny and will be upheld only upon a showing of a compelling
state interest.'9 5
Although the court stated its objection to the Rodriguez definition of
a fundamental right as one explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution,' " it agreed with the Rodriguez choice of the rational basis
test for equal protection claims. The court reasoned that the case was
an inappropriate one for "strict scrutiny" because it "deals with difficult
questions of local and statewide taxation, fiscal planning, and education
policy.,'97
Applying the traditional rational basis test to the wide disparities in
district expenditures, the court concluded that local control, which in-
cludes "not only the freedom to devote more money to the education of
193 Board of Edue. v. Walter, 10 Ohio Op. 3d 26 (lst Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
", Board of Edue. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979).
I' &d at 373, 390 N.E.2d at 817. See note 27 supra.
'" 58 Ohio St. 2d at 374, 390 N.E.2d at 818.
,, Id. at 375, 390 N.E.2d at 819. Cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44-53 (1973) (stating with particularity the rationale for ap-
plying the rational basis test).
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one's children but also control over and participation in the decision-
making process as to how these local tax dollars are to be spent,"198
justified the system with its inherent disparities. In applying the ra-
tional basis test the court adopted the presumption of constitutionality
of the state statute and noted that it would be held invalid only upon a
showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute was without a ra-
tional basis and therefore unconstitutional.
Although in Walter the supreme court adopted a presumption of con-
stitutionality with respect to legislative educational directives, the
court did not entirely foreclose judicial review of legislative enactments
in the area of education. It adopted the standard from Miller v. Korns,1"
defining a thorough and efficient system as follows:
With this very state purpose in view, regarding the problem as
a state-wide problem, the sovereign people made it mandatory
upon the General Assembly to secure not merely a system of
common schools, but a system thorough and efficient throughout
the state. A thorough system could not mean one in which part
or any number of the school districts of the state lacked
teachers, buildings or equipment."'
In the application of this standard, the Ohio Supreme Court asserted
that the wide discretion granted to the General Assembly is not
unlimited and that "in a situation in which a school district was receiv-
ing so little local and state revenue that the students were effectively
being deprived of educational opportunity . .. such a system would
clearly not be thorough and efficient"20 1 and would be subject to judicial
review. The court noted that the evidence of school closings and the
widespread inability of school districts to meet the state's minimum
standards were not the equivalent of "educational deprivation." Noting
that the school closings, which it denominated "school districts' calendar
adjustments," had not resulted in any student receiving less than the
full 182 days of instruction required by statute,"2 the court ignored the
cumulative effect of school closings. It also disregarded the fact that by
adjusting the calendar and extending it further into the next year, the
district was depleting the upcoming year's funds. As were the other
courts that adopted a non-interventionist position, the Ohio Supreme
Court was emphatic in asserting its authority to decide the issue before
it. 3 The defendants had argued that the court should refrain on
', 58 Ohio St. 2d at 377, 390 N.E.2d at 820.
19 107 Ohio St. 287, 140 N.E. 773 (1923) (upholding the General Assembly's
power to collect funds from one district for use in another school district).
I& at 297-98, 140 N.E. at 776.
21 58 Ohio St. 2d at 387, 390 N.E.2d at 825.
Id at 388, 390 N.E.2d at 825-26.
Id at 384, 390 N.E.2d at 813.
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"political question" grounds from judicial review of the General
Assembly's constitutional duty under the education clause. 20 4
The defendants also contended that the trial court overstepped its
power in deciding that the finance system represents an "abdication" by
the General Assembly of its duty under the education clause. The court
of appeals agreed with the defendants in addition to criticizing the trial
court for substituting "its judgment for that of the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches of government as to what constitutes high quality
education in this State and as to what is the most appropriate method to
secure such an education. 12 5 Even though the Ohio Supreme Court
asserted its authority to review and enforce the mandates of the con-
stitution which are directed at the legislative branch, the court never-
theless noted "the deference to be provided to the General Assembly in
education matters" ' and took as guidance the language of a much
earlier Ohio case: "'[W]ith the wisdom or the policy of such legislation
the court has no responsibility and no authority. Its duty is limited to in-
terpretation of such provisions as are not clear, and the carrying into
execution of laws enacted which are not in conflict with constitutional
provisions.' ,207
The impression created by Walter is that of a court extremely unwill-
ing to establish the pro-reform trend suggested in many interventionist
cases, including the New York case of Board of Education, Levittown
Union Free School District v. Nyquist.2°' This is evident in the high
standard of proof of unconstitutionality required by the Ohio Supreme
Court and its willingness to reinterpret factual findings of the trial
court as well as in its aborted legal analysis of the equal protection
issues. One also gets the impression from this opinion that the court
would act differently if things got bad enough.2" At base is the court's
belief that its intervention is not needed and that reform can be ap-
propriately achieved through the legislature. This is the crux of judicial
restraint and the position likely to be taken by an Ohio court because of
the climate generated by events occurring within the state.
As noted in the court's opinion, the Ohio General Assembly has not
been reluctant to engage in continuing study and reformation of the
educational financing system.20 The "guaranteed yield" system had
Id at 383-84, 390 N.E.2d at 813.
2 Board of Educ. v. Walter, 10 Ohio Op. 3d 26, 32 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
58 Ohio St. 2d at 385, 390 N.E.2d at 813.
207 Id. at 385, 390 N.E.2d at 813 (emphasis in original), quoting State ex rel
Methodist Children's Home Ass'n, Board of Educ., 105 Ohio St. 438, 448, 138 N.E.
865, 868 (1922).
2 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978). See notes 62, 68 supra.
-0 The Walter court intimated that if funding were sufficiently inadequate as
to deprive students of educational opportunities, it would be inclined to con-
travene legislative determinations. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 387, 390 N.E.2d at 825.
"' Id at 378-80, 390 N.E.2d at 820-22.
1979]
45Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1979
CLEVELAND STATE LA W REVIEW
been advocated by many school finance reformers as the most advanced
formula for achieving equalization of state expenditures and had been
enacted in 1975 to replace the ailing Foundation Program after several
years of legislative study of the school finance issue. The very facts urged
on the court to encourage intervention also militated against its involve-
ment; school closings, teachers' strikes, the problems of court interven-
tion in busing, and the low level of state funding of education ' had led
to heightened public awareness of the problems in the schools but had
not produced consensus concerning substitute proposals.
In light of this public debate, the fact that the challenged system was
in only its first year of a four-year phase-in program when the litigation
was brought is also significant. Throughout the trial the plaintiffs were
hindered by the necessity of presenting both current statistics and ex-
trapolations under a full-funding model.21 ' While plaintiffs' evidence sug-
gested that the system presently had a dis-equalizing effect,1 3 the defen-
dants' projections suggested that equalization would be achieved
through full funding. 14 Consequently, the supreme court was left to its
own competency to decide which projections would prevail. The decision
to abstain should not be surprising where the outcome of the present
system is unknown and the alternatives untested.
The Walter decision, although written in a tone of judicial restraint,
cannot be interpreted as an opinion prohibiting the judicial reform of
school finance systems. The court has placed the primary responsibility
for school finance reform on the legislature but has not denied the
judicial branch the power to review legislative reforms that have been
put into effect.
VI. CONCLUSION
This review of recent state court decisions suggests that there is suf-
ficient basis for state court intervention in school finance reform at the
present time. The interventionist decisions have established a basis for
invoking either the strict scrutiny or the rational basis test for equal
protection claims and for overcoming the lack of judicially manageable
standards for assessing educational quality and equality. It is important
to note, however, that the actions of any one state court are likely to
211 In late session on June 28, 1979, the Ohio General Assembly agreed on an
appropriations bill that included $3.5 billion for primary and secondary public
education and that guarantees most districts a seven percent increase in State
Basic Aid and a ten percent increase in 1981 over the 1979 level. The Blade, June
29, 1979, at 1, col. 4. See Act of July 30, 1979, [1979] Ohio Laws 6-3.
" Such conclusions and extrapolations are interspersed throughout the trial
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Board of Educ. v. Walter, No.
A7602725 (Ohio C.P. Hamilton County Dec. 5, 1977).
213 Id passim.
214 See generally Brief for Defendants-Appellants, Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58
Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979).
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have little predictive value for litigants in another state despite
similarities in state constitutional provisions or funding systems. The
conflicting goals of school finance reform, educational versus property
tax equality, and increased state spending for education make many
state courts justifiably leery of intervening in an area of questionable
authority and of imposing a judicial solution in an atmosphere charged
with political debate. The likelihood of judicial intervention would ap-
pear to be greater if the facts show egregious inequality in educational
opportunity and if there is widespread public support for the proposi-
tion that the current system fails to provide the education guaranteed
by the particular state constitution. Nevertheless, such circumstances
by no means guarantee judicial intervention.
Neither is there consensus regarding the probable success of the pro-
posed alternative funding models. Recent studies of the results of school
finance reform in representative states suggest, in fact, that reform
measures have had little effect on the equalization of educational oppor-
tunity. District power equalizing formulas have had little effect on the
wealth neutrality of the financing system, and weighting systems
designed to compensate for higher costs of providing educational ser-
vices and materials in some locations widened disparities in revenues
and instructional expenditures per pupil among the districts, creating a
demonstrable income-educational revenues relationship rather than the
property-revenue relationship that existed previously. 15 Because such
215 Guaranteed tax base plans in Kansas and New Mexico, designed to equalize
district taxing power, have had little effect on fiscal neutrality. In Kansas, which
coupled school financing reform measures with a ten percent rebate of income
taxes to the district for the purpose of reducing district property taxes, ceilings
were placed on the amount of revenue that could be raised by each district (the
lower of fifteen percent of previous year's budget or five percent of the median
budget for districts in the same size category). The effect of this reform was to
shift the school tax burden from property tax to the income tax and to return
more tax money to the high wealth districts in which higher spending rates pro-
duced a greater income tax rebate. Consequently, educational revenues have
become more closely tied to income wealth than under the pre-reform plan. S.
CARROLL, supra note 100, at 104-07, 121-25. Reform measures in Michigan which
placed no ceiling on a district's revenue-generating power have produced
somewhat more fiscal neutrality than prior to reform, but richer districts shall
have a clear advantage. Wealthier districts have not cut educational spending,
poorer districts have increased educational budgets, but at a relatively controlled
rate. Analysts attribute the slight change to the conservative response to district
votes. Id at 137-38. Reform measures in Florida and New Mexico have brought
both states very close to full state funding of public schools. Both states' financ-
ing systems include a state-wide property tax rate and formulas based on
"weighted-student" indices adjusted for district cost differentials. Florida's ad-
justment factors are based on the cost of living index for the county; since the
cost of living is higher in high income districts, and because the distribution of
"weighted-pupils" is virtually identical to the distribution of all pupils, the effect
of the reform has been to widen disparities in instructional revenues per pupil,
decreasing wealth neutrality and creating an income bias. Id at 88-89. The New
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systems are indexed to teacher-experience factors and existing salaries
as well as to the higher salaries required to attract teachers to city
school districts, weighting systems tend to lock in disparities from the
pre-reform period. The more refined systems that might be designed by
statisticians to compensate for these differences are unlikely to survive
the legislative process without the addition of exceptions and "save
harmless" clauses that reflect compromise and special interest group ad-
vocacy by the currently favored districts.
None of this is to suggest that the courts should entirely foreclose
consideration of the school finance issue, but it does suggest recognition
of the difficult dilemma facing a judiciary concerned about actual or ap-
parent judicial overreaching. It is difficult to define the role of a state
court that wishes to assume a non-interventionist position in a suit
challenging a legislatively-enacted funding system. Avoiding the issue
entirely by dismissing the action on the political question basis will
lessen the impetus for reform. Even if a court does not want to assume
an interventionist position, it should be critical of the obvious inequities
in legislation. A non-intervening court pointing out problems to the
legislature may continue reform in the area of legislative changes. To
date no state supreme court has adopted the middle ground which
would invalidate the statute to the extent that it includes provisions
that are clearly dis-equalizing while upholding legislative discretion
with respect to the remainder of the funding formula. An order enjoin-
ing disbursement of funds under such provisions would provide a prin-
cipled decision that keeps judicial intervention to a minimum but avoids
the charge that the court has been blind to an obvious inequality.
Mexico reform system has had a similar effect, creating a significant relationship
between income wealth of the district and instructional expenditures. The cost
adjustment factor under the New Mexico system is based on teacher training and
experience in each district. Because of the tradition of higher teacher salaries in
high-wealth districts, the weighting and adjustment systems provide additional
"equalizing" revenues to high-wealth districts as well as to urban high-cost
schools. Id at 148-55.
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